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Having come most recently from duty as Gunnery Officer
aboard a destroyer in the Pacific, it was natural that I should
choose the subject of ship operating costs for further study.
What surprised me, however, was the intense interest indicated
by the many naval officers and other Navy Department personnel
with whoa I came in contact during the course of my investiga-
tions* This interest stems from one central fact; although the
funds involved make up only a small fraction of the total navy
budget, they have an enormous impact on every-day fleet readi-
ness* Accordingly, they have an importance out of all proportion
to their size.
The first problem I posed was to study how the present
budget is put together* I therefore began ay interviews in the
Bureau of Ships Comptrollers office, and worked my way down to
the Atlantic Fleet destroyer type commander, and up to the CNO
and H&vy Comptroller level* This thesis reflects, in large
measure, the generous cooperation and time given me by the many
officials interviewed.
In addition to interviews concerning the present system,
I asked many questions about possible improvements to the
system, and I found this to be a most provocative subject. In
addition, I attempted to survey the field of printed matter in
this area, although I concluded this field is indeed sparse*
iii

In the course of say research, I was struck by the fact that most
of the thinking in this area is being done by Supply Corps
officers, both in the fleet and in Washington. This reflects,
I think, the primary orientation of most line officers to the
"non-dollar" side of the navy economy* Nevertheless, it seems
apparent that nsore progress will be made in improved financial
management only when the line of the navy begins to take a more
active interest in the jnany problems involved.
My investigations confirmed, to my satisfaction at least,
another "side issue" • Namely, that the present organization
of the Navy is not conducive to the ready flow of communications
between the operating forces and the Navy Department concerning
financial, and other logistic matters. There exists today a
real need for positive communication and direction between
BuShips, CNO, and the Fleets. In several instances, I was struck
by the fact that, apparently, BuShips talks to the Fleets, the
Fleets talk to CNO f and CNO talks to the Fleets, and BuShips,
but not at the same time, I sincerely hope that the creation
of the new Fleet Activities Command, directly under CNO, will
provide a channel of direct communication and direction, and put
an end to the pseudo-decentralized system that presently exists.
Although I found, during my studies, that a great deal
of interest and thought is being generated in the area of
improved financial management for the operating forces, I do not
believe that major improvements will be made without further
reorganisation at the fleet level. The problem of funding is
iv

only a part of the broader problem of resource allocation.
While it is true that the fleets are primarily concerned with
non-dollar resources, it is equally true that these non-dollar
resources have dollar implications* Under existing fleet
organisation, there is no official primarily charged with the
responsibility for taking a broad view of the control of resourc-
es, both dollar and non-dollar. The Fleet Fiscal Officer is
but a sub-office of the Fleet Material Office, and his function
is primarily that of a bookkeeper. It seems essential to me
that both the Fleet and Type commanders establish a Comptroller
in their organizations, who will be able to view in broad
context the dollar-resource allocation problem as well as the
"spillover* implications of the non-dollar resources. Unless
a fleet comptroller position is established, the new fleet
Activities Command will find, as I did, that there is no one
office within the fleet organisation with whom they can talk
about money.
This thesis assumes a moderate degree of knowledge, on
the part of the reader, of Navy organisation, and government
finance. This assumption is necessary in order to be able to
proceed to the subject matter i^ithout the need for extensive
presentation of background material. Throughout the work,
however, I have attempted to preserve the "big picture" without
becoming isameshed in details. Nevertheless, some details are
necessary in order to understand the problems, and, where
necessary, the detail is presented. One difficulty in presenting
v

details is that they change with great rapidity. Thus, while
the details presented herein were researched to the best of my
ability, the reader is cautioned that they may well have changed
somewhat since the January-Harch, 1963 period when I completed
ay research.
Finally, any discussion of a specific piece of a broader
problem tends naturally to exaggerate the importance of the
specifics offered, and to understate the significance of other
aspects. Thus, this thesis concerns itself primarily with the
resource allocation decisions a ship comiaander must wake. It
must be remembered » however, that & naval commander irust function
in a sphere larger than that of a "resource manager" » He ®ust
use judgment in an almost infinite variety of circumstances
not even closely related to woney^ or material* Host Important*
he must be a leader, a "father-figure", and an inspiration to
his crew, 2*1 hours a day, Nevertheless, I would argue that he
»uat also be a manager, a function many commanding officers, in
the press of other problems, sonetifcea tend to ignore. It is
to furthering a broader understanding of the management function
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis seeks to investigate four questions. What
is a "true" budget? How can a combatant ship be viewed as an
economic entity? What is the present navy system of raana
the operating funds of combatant ships? How can this present
system be more rationally mashed with the broader problem of
managing the entity?
Heedless to say, this is a complex, perhaps profound t
subject. It is an area of study for which there are no "ri^ht"
answers, although there are, probably, "better" answers. It is,
therefore, manifestly impossible to cover "all bases* in studying
these questions. Instead, this thesis hopes only to highlight
some of the most significant issues hearing on these questions,
and to indicate where we wight go to look for better answers.
In order to rcixaain somewhat specific, the paper addressee
itself specifically to the financial problems of destroyers;
for the most part, Atlantic Fleet destroyers. Inasmuch as a
destroyer represents a little of everything found in other navy
ships, it would seem logical that the results of this study can
be generalized to fit other classes and types. In spite cf an
attempt to remain specific, however, the subject matter does
wander somewhat. This is largely because, like the thread of s
sweater, the subject of ships' operating funds is woven into

2almost every other aspect of logistics, and operations. Thus,
a discussion of Supplies and Equipage funds (as they ere defined
in Chapter II) takes us quickly up the primrose path of supply,
allowance list preparation, and even the basic organisation of
the Mavy* In most instances, however, we shall merely indicate
where these paths might lead, and then return to the main road*
Chapter I investigates what a budget is, in both the
business and government senses* In Chapter II, the destroyer is
considered as an entity in an attempt to see it In the "big
picture** • Chapter III examines in some detail the way the
present budget is put together and the funds managed. Finally,
in Chapter IV, the ship is considered in a broader context, and
the way is pointed towards some better solutions to the basic
question, a rational management system.

CHAPTER I
AT IS A BUDGET? AND WHY??
Introduction
There is little doubt that, to the average line commander,
a budget is a restriction. It is a "no-sayin?" deviee which
tells him what he cannot do. In the extreme case, it is an
arbitrary document, drawn up by others ignorant of his needs,
whittled at and cut by still others unmindful of his responsi-
bilities, and passed down to him with the sb*rp reminder that
if he exceeds it, he my go to jail* Thus, in terras of its
execution, a budget is perceived by the military commander as
being a bank balance, or even a blank cheek, but rarely is it
thought to be a plan or a particularly useful rsana^ement tool*
Budgets in the Business Sense
In the words of management theory: HA budget is a plan
of action for a business, expressed in dollar terms, for a
definite period of time*"X Thus, the emphasis is placed clearly
on the budget as an expression of a planning process*
A Budget represent© management f s financial and
operating plan or forecast for i future period. It
is a statement of expected revenue and expense and
*'g% F. Coggan, "What Hanageeent Expects frOB the Budget
,
(
Business Bud&etlng * January, 1956.

of financial status under certain anticipated internal
and external conditions. The budget is developed on
the basis of past experience , with modifications in
accordance with management's anticipated changes in
policy and judgment and analysis of expected future
conditions, a budget serves as a gttlda to the activi-
ties of a single department or of the entire business
and establishes goals which ire expected to be aonisved
during the following month, quarter, or year, 1
But the budget is more than just a plan* It is a vital
management control tool, "Harking against the columns of
•Budgeted 1 data the corresponding figures of 'actual' performance
brings forth the control aspects of the budget, n
Thus, plans and budgets together provide a picture,
in common related tH*tl| of what is intended and expected
and the means by which the goal* are to be achieved.
They provide a means tot? reporting back the progress
made gainst the £»,<v*ls, and a general framework for new
decisions and action in an integrated pattern of
development,
3
It is clear, then, that as far as the management
theorists are concerned, a budget la the link between r>lans and
accomplishments. Certainly, they would pondton the notion that
a budget la LtttiP* calling, or oaraly a bank balance,
A budget wakes sense only if the dollars budgeted (expenditures)
are directly tied to work done.
Such a budget is far mora than a document. It £ »n
Ralph Bala Kennedy and Frederick Charles Kurtz,
Introductory Account inn (Scranton, Pa,s International
Textbook Co., 1960), p. 710,
2
Alex W, Rathe, "Management Control," Advanced Management *
XV, 3 (1950), p. 9.
IArnold F. Erach, "Control Means Action," Harvard Business
Review, July-August, 19SH, p, 32,

5integral part of a management system* Among the more important
features of such a system are these , listed by James L. Peirce,
a past president of the Controllers Institutes
Best results are achieved when the budget is
developed at the lowest possible level of operating
management, with the assistance of a budget staff.
Top management must first provide guidelines on
anticipated volumes and performance standards. Each
budget is merged with others at successive levels of
management, until top management finally approves the
overall budget. In developing the budget, it is
important that individual managers be charged only
with costs over which they may exercise some control.
The accounting system must be keyed to the budget
plan. 1
The system Hr. Peirce envisions is the classic one in which the
budget is "built-up* from the lowest working level, and
successively merged and reviewed as it passes up the organiza-
tional hierarchy. Such a system assumes, of course, that the
lower level manager is first provided with rather specific
guidance as to anticipated work load and performance standards
to be used in formulating his estimates. A budget formulated
in this way has the dual advantage of being closely related to
the organizational structure, and being closely related to the
lower level manager, since he had a hand in developing it.
Hr. Peirce goes on to sayt
The level of management which can authorise
deviations from the budget should be as low as
possible. The magnitude of the effect of the decision
on profits should be the determinant. A budget should
also provide for periodic review all the way up to
top management. 2




6Implicit in the business budget is the concept that the
dollar figures do not represent expenditure ceilings, but merely
cost targets. The eyes of management are on results obtained
(i.e., units produced) versus cost, not on cost alone* Thus, the
lower level manager is not forbidden from exceeding his budget,
but he must bear the responsibility for achieving results com-
mensurate with the over-expenditure.
The good business budget is also careful to distinguish
"controllable" from wnon-controllable H costs. The department
manager or foreman will be held responsible only for those costs
over which he can exercise some control. Similarly, the capital
costs are separated from the operating costs. Thus, in theory
at least, those costs which are incurred by a department which
will accrue a future benefit or pay-off will be considered
separately from costs incurred in the course of current opera-
tions.
The advantages of a good business budget have been
summarized this ways
1. It should tie the many diverse plans of a
company into a unified whole.
2. The budget program should bring about a
coordination among departments.
3. It should assign responsibility for each
kind of expenditure. Budget reports should measure
performance against plan, detect deviations, and analyze
and propose remedies.
»*. It should reduce waste and promote efficiency.
5. It should flag possible trouble areas.
6. It should provide a means of determining
financing needs.
*
i in ii 1 1
i




7Note that responsibility for expenditures is only one
goal among six, and, further, that "reduction of expenditures"
is not mentioned, although efficiency is.
Implicit in any discussion of business budgeting are
two additional factors. The goal of any business is profit
maximisation. Thus, the success of the business (and of most
of its constituent parts) can be measured in terms of increased
profit. Furthermore, business firms produce some output which
is capable of measurement. In most cases, units of product can
be readily determined, but in all firms, output can also be
expressed in terms of dollars. This is true of both a factory
producing widgets, and of a law firm whose output is basically
"thinking" • In any attempt to translate the concepts of budget-
ing into the government sphere, these two factors will come back
to haunt us.
Budgets in the Federal Government
The historical foundations of federal financial manage-
ment were laid in the clause of the U. S. Constitution which
provides that*
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular
statement and account of receipts and expenditures of
all public money shall be published from time to time.*
The purpose of this provision was to give the Congress the power
of the purse over the actions of the executive. A concomitant
i ii . . I i n . ii iii i I,, i i n 1 1 ii i I. i
XU. S., Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 9,

8result was to lay heavy emphasis on control of expenditures
which was to evolve into an even greater concern over control
of obligations. Thus, from the very beginning, congressional
control over the purse strings was to be exercised in the form
of expenditure ceilings established through appropriations.
With this impetus behind it, the federal government
budget process is
primarily a system of communications, regularized and
cyclical* Its purposes fall into two logical categories:
first, the bringing of information to the proper level
for the making of decisions » • «| and, second, the
providing of information both upward and downward so
that those decisions will be properly carried out,*
In other words, the budget is an instrument by which the
executive formalizes &n& transmits its plans and desires to
Congress, which in turn transmits downward its decisions for
compliance by the executive.
In business thinking, budgeting is intimately associated
with planning. So also is it in government . According to a
Navy training publication, "The Navy budget is a planning and
control instrument which sets forth in terms of dollars the
annual work of the Department,*'* But such a statement may
"be more a declaration of principle than a description of
actuality, , • • There is also reason to believe that much
1
Frederick C, Hosher, Prograia Budfeetimii Theory a:
I




U. $., Department of the J«avy, Bureau of Naval
Personnel, Financial rian&Eement in the Navy , Navy publication
Ho, NAVPERS 1^92-A, 1^62, p, 35.

9planning occurs independently of budgeting and with very little
relation to it." 1 This separation is a result of many factors,
not the least of which are some important differences between
governa&ent and business budget principles. By their very
nature, government budgets are very formal in structure, and
are inflexible once they are enacted into appropriations. Fur-
ther, most business budgets include allowances for anticipated
price and wage changes, whereas government budgets may not
2
anticipate such contingencies,
A further factor which has tended to separate planning
and budgeting is the accounting systera. As evolved frost the
constitutional requirement, government accounting has focused
on obligations and expenditures, in order to assure congress and
the president that the appropriations voted by congress were
not exceeded. In an important sense then, budgeting has been
closely associated with accounting and bookkeeping. These arts
have grown more and more complex, in turn calling for greater
expertise and, at the sa&e time, widening the %*p between those
engaged in planning and those engaged in budgeting. Furthermore,
there is little historical precedent for the correlation of
the processes and organisations for military planning with those
for budgeting,»** Planning has traditionally been associated with
Moshar, p. H7.
2
"Navy Budget vs. Business Budget," Navy Comptroller
Review, March, 10CC, p. G.
3Hosher, p. Ha. **Xbid. » p, bH.
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military operations, while budgeting has beer the business of
(frequently civilian) administrative processes,
finally, budget execution is greatly influenced by the
rigidity of governmental burets. Instead o* being targets,
budget figures become "bank balances" • As the Hoover Commission
noted
t
It (the federal budget system) Places emphasis
on the ability to live within allotments rather than
on the usual management criterion of performance in
terms of cost* It contains the inherent incentive
to spenc all alloted funds in order to support
succeeding allotment requests •*
By so regarding budget figures, it is only natural to regard
budgets not as a management tool but as a check on management
flexibility. It is only a step from here to regarding the budget
process not as a synthesis of plan and dollar, but solely as a
means of getting money with which to operate*
The Performance Budget
. i i n i
The "gap" that exists between planning and budgeting
in the federal government has not gone unnoticed* It has been
the subject of considerable debate and many recommendations,
ever since World Wax* IX* In particular, the concept of a
performance budget as a "theme Bong* of the Hoover Commission
studies. This recommendation* as well as most other Hoover
X
U* 3*, Commission on Organisation of the Executive
branch of the Government (Second Hoover Commiaaion) . Budgeting
and Accountings A Report, to the Contrreas (Washington! Government
Printing Office, 1955), p. 3 6*
2Kosher, p fl 7G.

Commission recommendations, was heavily influenced by the fact
that most members of the Commission were from the business
community, and approached the budget in classical business terms,
"The central idea of the performance budget is decoptively
simple. It is that the budget process be focused upon programs
and functions—that is, accomplishments to be achieved, work to
be done*"1 In fact, a performance budget weans many thing! to
many people, Huch of the controversy stems from differences of
opinion over what is a program. In part, this arises from the
mutual exclusivity of the two fundamental ways of looking at a
budget. From the viewpoint of executive and legislative decision
making, programs should focus on broad functions and objectives
(e.g., Continental Air Defense). However, from the standpoint
of internal administration, budget programs should be compatible
with organisation. To carry the argument one step further, a
base commander would consider & performance budget to be one in
which he received a single allotment cf money with which he would
provide the various services necessary to carry out his mission.
From the viewpoint of the Surgeon General, a performance budget
would be one in which he received a single allotment of money
with which to provide medical care throughout the Navy, without
regard to the location of the hospital or dispensary. To the
top*-most policy makers, a performance budget woula ba one in which
the costs of performing particular military functions (e.g., Anti-




and budget structure compatible with one of these "slices" is
incompatible with the others. No amount of reorganisation can
eliminate this incompatibility.
A furtlier complication involves the jaeasureuent of
output. In any producing enterprise, output can readily be
measured in terms of so many units. Even where physical goods
are not produced, as in the case of the law firm, so long as a
market environment exists, output can be defined as "sales"
(in dollars), however, most government activities do not result
in Measurable output, and certainly military combat forces do
not. Thus, in spite of our best efforts to prepare budgets on
the basis of accomplishments to be achieved instead of things
to be purchase % we mist fall back on the identification of
"things" (e. ., so aiany divisions of troops, so many aircraft
carriers, etc.) to be purchased instead of work done in the
truest sense. For this reason, the biggest part of military
budgets and of military budgeting is of, by, for, and to the
logistical (support) organisations, rather than to the ultimate
i
user. These units do produce measurable output, such as number
of ships repaired, items of supply issued, etc. Thus, these
units frequently become the focal points of the "programs" in
our performance budgets, Nevertheless, it must be remembered
that the ultimata responsibility for establishing requirements
rests not with the logistic unit, but with the user, the combat
unit, with few exceptions, the responsibility for performance




is separated from responsibility for budgets, even under our
"performance * budgeting concept.
*
The 3>fenee Pr: ,. . Systen
*:h the arrival er: the czzr..** of Defense Secretary
McNaciara, renewed emphasis has been given to closing the planning*
budgeting gap. Under the presently oper Lug system
initiated in May, 1961, program control is firmly vested in the
hands of the Secretary of Defense. All functions of the Depart-
ment of Defense were grouped into nine "functional** progrs.
I Strategic Retaliatory Torsos,
II Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces.
Ill General Purpose Forces.
IV Airlift and Sealift.
V Reserve and Guard Forces.






These programs are further subdivided into program elements,
which are the basic building blocks of the system, and are
" I II II M I H H. IH lW l IIPIIIIH I llll I m i IHW I I Ill II i III I II II m i n i Ill I naim iip III! 1111111111
1
Such a dichotomy need not exist, in theory at least*
Hitch and McKean, in their book, The Economics of Defense in the
Nuclear Aae (Cambridge, K*se«l harvard University Press, 1960),
p. 222, take note of a "bold and original proposal" sz&6e by
Professor A. P. Lerner of Amherst College. Prof. Lerner's
concept calls for sums of money (budgets) to be wade available
to theater CNMMBSnders who would buy the «aen <*nd materials they
require from the logistic and training commands. The primary
task of the Joint Chiefs, in such a plan, would be to allocate
dollars to the various theaters. Such a proposal, although far
too re4ioel to be "practical" is an interesting attempt to
extend the market system to the evens of defense*
2
U. 3*| Department of the ^iavy, Dffies of the Ksvy
Comptroller, Program Change Control System in the Department of
* Wl « l .|JMl>WIII»«<>»l lllWMWMMI» l I HUH —— — — 1-IP — lil ——»i «—,— ! ! m .... ! , H I I — I — —— - — !






defined as: wan integrated activity consisting of men, equipment,
and installations whose effectiveness can be related to national
security objectives. wl Each program element is projected ahead,
in terms of its cost, for five years (and force levels for
another five years), with costs broken down into three categories:
Research and Development, Investment, and Operating. Thus, the
Secretary of Defense can readily see the long-run cost implica-
tions (over a five year period at least) of each program element.
The bridge between planning and budgeting is provided by the
further breakdown of costs for each program element into the
regular budget format (appropriation titles). The approved
program is published in the form of the "Five Year Force Structure
and Financial Plan" book, and, in effect, sets "in concrete"
the existing force structure* Henceforth, changes in force
structure («»g« t the number of destroyers in the fleets) will
be decided in the form of a program change proposal submitted
to the Secretary of Defense. Thus, budgeting, for any given
year, consists basically of lifting out that years increment
in the approved force structure, with costs broken down by the
traditional budget titles, refining the costs on the basis of
more recent information, and casting these costs into the budget
format. The importance of this programming systera as a device
to achieve more rational decision making at the top cannot be
over-emphasiaed.
« i n ! ii.i.i «« m I i l II i ii n i .1 »n . i .. .ii.ii i II i -
Ibid ., p. 2-3.
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The effect of the programming system on budget execu-
tion, however, has been to re-emphasize the fact that, in a
complex organization, there is a fundamental dichotomy between
budget formulation (the plan) and budget execution* Decisions
between alternative prograas can only be made at the top (The
Secretary of Defense, President, and Congress)* However, budget
execution, with a view towards maximizing economy and efficiency,
can best be carried out at the lowest executive level concerned
with a given operation* *• The supervisor of a base motor pool
is in a much better position to effect economy in the operation
of the motor pool than is the base commander, and certainly
better than the Secretary of Defense* Nevertheless, an informa-
tion system designed to provide information for making program
choices at the top will not necessarily provide the local
manager with the information he needs to carry out his operations
efficiently. Thus, these two aspects of budgeting, formulation
and execution, should be regarded as separate but related
operations, with full recognition of the fact that the informa-
tion systems for each function have fundamentally different
objectives, although they should complement each other* Further,
neither the requirements of management nor policy reporting will
be Mt by accounting alone.
*
i ' » n i. m i i i i i h i i ii ii m i i ii ii n
Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United





Conclusions«M—M*MI II Ill W
To a businessman* a budget is a management tool. It
links plans with the resources required for their accomplishment,
as measured in dollars. It is flexible in that it is predicated
on a measurable output} if the output changes, the input (budget)
must also change* Budgets, as he sees them, are built up from
the lowest practicable managerial level, based on guidance as to
production levels, and performance standards to be used, furnished
by the top manager. If variations from budget occur, they are
viewed in the light of variations in output. The budget, then,
is the embodiment of the top manager's plan, broken down into
smaller pieces for each lower level. The pieces of budget are
the primary management tools for lower level managers, and the
ascending budget reports are the primary management tools for
top managers.
In government, the budget has historically evolved from
a requirement that congress control the executive through the
power of the purse. Emphasis is on expenditures, since appropria-
tions represent ceilings, not targets. Further, because of its
sheer size, a dichotomy exists between planning and execution.
Rather than being built up from the bottom based on guidelines,
budget planning is being increasingly done at the top, as an
integral part of the process of program decision making. Since
program decisions cut across organizational lines, the informa-
tion systems for budget planning and budget execution must, of
necessity, conflict. Thus, from the viewpoint of the middle and

17
lower managers, the budget planning system may seemingly pass
hint by, while the budget execution systera fails to provide him
with the information he need© to discharge efficiently his
responsibilities. There appears to be no way to alter the
system of (and information required for) budget formulation, as
seen by the middle and lower managers* However, the needs of
these managers for an improved information system for budget
execution can and must be met, since operating efficiency can
only be achieved on the "firing line".*
As previously stated, there is a fundamental conflict
between the informational needs of the top and the bottom. Thus,
it would appear that the only fruitful path is to achieve a
dual information and accounting system that is as complementary
as possible, while recognising that a single integrated systesa
that can build up information useful for both budget formulation
and execution is probably impossible to achieve.

CHAPTER II
THE BBSTROYBR AS AN ENTITY
IntroductionII. i i i— «—«—t—
The adequacy of a budget system depends, In large
measure, on the perspective of the questioner* Most frequently,
budget systems are viewed in the literature "in the large*.
In this chapter4 , we shall examine a budget system "in the small"
,
from the viewpoint of an individual Navy ship. To lend specifi-
city to the argument, we shall confine our examination to a
specific type and class of ship, the General Purpose Destroyer
<DD), and in particular, Destroyers in the U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
However, the Navy budget system applies in a similar manner to
all other types and classes of ships, although specific procedures
vary, and certainly the dollar amounts involved are different*
The Destroyer—An Entity
A destroyer is a self-contained (although not necessarily
self-sufficient), mobile, combat unit. It1 is considered a
"builuing block" unit for military planning purposes, and an
I IH II M I I llil i M UK Ill HU M H I II II
The use of the word "it" to refer to a ship, instead of
the traditional "she" will pain many naval officers, as it does
»e. "It" is used to refer to the characteristics of a ship as
an entity, in recognition of the fact that many husaan factors





identifiable "program element" for programming purposes. 1 Although i
a rather small number of personnel are assigned (about 270 offic-
ers and men) when compared to other identified "building block"
combat units , a destroyer contains most of the support elements
eommonly found in much larger shore bases. In particular, the
mobile characteristics of rf*»«.Troyers call for a hi^h degree of
s elf•maintenance, independent of outside assistance. This, in
turn, calls for the provisioning, of a very considerable number
of repair parts, and maintenance tools and instruments, as well
as many highly trained personnel.
In attempting to view a destroyer as an entity, one
is immediately faced with the problem of defining its output.
The output is obviously, in subjective terras, combat power, or
in peacetime, combat readiness. This combat readiness exists
in several readiness areas, each interdependent but not identical.
In broad terms, these readiness areas ares Anti-Air Warfare,
Anti-Submarine Warfare, Surface Warfare, and Mobility. 2 Since
Destroyers are included in Program III—General Purposes
Forces, under the major gx'ouping, Hulti-rurpose Combat Forces.
Other elements under this grouping <tr« Cruisers, and Frigates.
U. S., Department of the Navy, Program Change Control System ,
p. C-2. Also, Supra . » p. 13.
These definitions are taken from standard naval warfare
doctrine. Thus, Anti-Air Warf«p« Involves readiness of the
Detection and Tracking devices (e.g. radars), and the Gun and
Missile batteries. Anti-Submarine Warfare involves readiness
of the Detection and Tracking devices (e.g., sonars), and the
Anti-Submarine weapons. Surface Warfare involves readiness of
the Detection devices again, the Surface gun and missile
batteries, and Surface an<X Shora-Fire control devices. Mobility
involves readiness of the Propulsion Plant, and the readiness
to control battle damage. All of these readiness areas involve




the destroyer is a "multi-purpose** combat element, the degree
of readiness required in any given readiness area would depend
on the operational requirements of the moment, Thufs, a destroyer
might be •'ready** for anti-submarine warfare even though one of
its guns was inoperative. * Furthermore, within each readiness
area, the degree of readiness is, in fact, a continuum. For
example, one gun mieht be inoperative, or several ;uns; they
might be incapable of firing at all, or they might be capable
of firing only at a reduced rate. Thus, although it is clear
that the "output" of a destroyer is combat readiness, the precise
meaning of combat readiness is an elusive characteristic. This
lack of a readily measurable output is a key problem area in
defining the destroyer as an entity. Nevertheless, in a
subjective sense, and in gross terms, we can see that an output
does exist.
We can therefore state that a destroyer is an entity
(a capital structure), constructed for the purpose of producing
coinbat readiness, and given over to a Coannandlng Officer with
two objectives for him to carry out. These objectives arei
(1) To keep the entity intact (in perpetuity, unless otherwise
directed), and (2) To maximize the production of combat readiness
""This example merely illustrates the meaning of inter-
dependent but not identical, A destroyer engaged in Anti-
submarine Warfare might, at any moment, have to defend itself
against air attack, for which it would not be "ready". Further-
more, mobility readiness would appear to be a common requirement
to all other areas, although in & given operational situation a
lesser speed might be acceptable in order to still qualify as
"ready". Thus, the sub-division of readiness is illustrative,
but at the same time, highly arguable.
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by the most efficient utilization of the resources made
available*
To produce an output , a destroyer must receive resource
inputs. These inputs are the classic ones* men, materials, and
money. Thus, our problem is, in the words of Defense Comptroller
Hitch, "How can we use these resources efficiently to buy military
power," 4* or, in our ter&s to buy combat readiness. From the
outset, it must be recognised that our problem is one of "sub~
©ptiiaizing". As defined by liitch, "Analyses « • • confined to
lower level contexts, which assume decisions given at higher
and collateral levels, are called 'sub-optimizations' • " That
is, our resource allocation must, of necessity, be ntade in a
context of constraints imposed from "outside". Let us examine,
therefore, how these resources arc presently made available to
the Commanding Officer of a destroyer.
Men
Men are assigned to naval ships on the basis of an
allowance (peacetime manning) and complement C wartime manning)
developed by the Chief of Haval Operations and the Bureau of
Naval Personnel. These allowances provide for •••igronent of
———«———M lil i—WWi win i .h i ii ———— ii————I—»M—
i
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Suggested during an interview with Capt. R. R. Campbell,
Assistant Fleet Supply Of flour, U« 8, Atlantic Fleet,
March 1963.
o
Charles J. Hiton and Roland N. McKcan, The economics of
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I Ibid., p. 128
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specified numbers of officers and men, in specified grades
,
possessing specified skills. Military personnel are paid from
the appropriation, Military Personnel, Navy, and, as far as
the destroyer CO is concerned, are "free". Basic training (by
which is meant basic military and technical training) is also
provided prior to the assignment of personnel aboard ship* Thus,
manpower resources are made available in a fixed quantity, and
at no cost* However, the effective utilisation of these resources
requires their proper assignment and supervision, and additional
and extensive training in the specific tasks required of them in
their particular assignment. Since some of the additional train-
ing is very complicated and demanding, it must be accomplished
in shore based schools where training is the full time duty of
the student* The cost of these schools is "free* to the CO,
but the cost of sending his men to them is not* He must obtain
travel funds from higher authority, 2 for which he must compete
with other ship commanders* Further, he must sacrifice the
presence of the man on board ship for the duration of the school*
In conducting training on board ship, the CO must constantly
make decisions allocating the time available of his manpower
•The availability of personnel, navywide, usually
dictates that ships receive less men than their allowance calls
for* Of equal, or greater, importance is the fact that the
relative scarcity of highly trained personnel usually necessitate!
the substitution of less well trained, less experienced personnel
for those called for, qualitatively, in the allowance*
2
In this instance, the destroyer type commander,
Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U* S* Atlantic Fleet*
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resources. In allocating this time, he is under some
constraints, since there are only 2U hours in a day, some time
must be allowed off for meals and rest, and some for liberty
and leave. Thus, in aaanaging his manpower, the coransanding
officer is faced with the problem of allocating man-hours, and,
to the extent that he uses shore-based schools, allocating
money as well.
As we ascend the organisational scale, it is apparent
that ssaany of the personnel "costs" which are free to the ship
commander are very real to other echelons. Thus, the real cost
of our destroyer must include the cost of personnel assigned
(and the various pay suppleiaentals and allowances), the cost
of training, the cost of travel, and the various other "people"
costs, such as personnel administration. It is clear that the
individual CO bears but a tiny fraction of the money-cost burden
of his manpower resources. At the same time, it must also be
recognized that the administration and supervision of his
personnel is his principal job, and takes up the bulk of his
time.
Material
The material requirements of a destroyer are manifold.
However, they can broadly be classified into two groups: those
required to maintain the entity intact, and those required to
operate the entity and "buy" operational readiness.
Examples of the former class are repair parts, teat
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equipment, and replacement items (for items lost or destroyed).
Examples of the latter class include fuels and lubricants
,
ammunition, food, and teletype paper (a not inconsiderable item).
As in industry, a large grey area exists between pure capital
conservation costs and pure operating costs. For example, is
paint a maintenance (conservation) item or an operating item?
Nevertheless, it is possible (with some arbitrariness, to be
sure) to classify every material item into one of these two
groups.
The major part of capital conservation is accomplished
by periodic overhaul of the ship at a shipyard. During the
overhaul, the hull, machinery, weapons, and other equipments
are inspected and repaired or replaced in order to assure,
within the standards of good engineering practice, that the
life of the item will be extended to the next overhaul period
(usually every two years for destroyers). Funds for the over-
hauls are provided by the Fleet Commander and, again, are "free"
to the ship's CO.
In between overhauls, numerous maintenance tasks must
*It would seem that a sound overhaul will greatly
reduce subsequent maintenance, and such is usually the case.
However, the overhaul is primarily concerned with the "deep"
maintenance problem, such as prolonged hull and piping system
life* The "shallow" maintenance problems, such as electronic
component failures, may not be appreciably reduced by an
overhaul. The test of a good overhaul is not, therefore, the
complete absence of material failures, but, rather, the
"cost" of repairing the subsequent failures. If "deep"
maintenance is good, the overall cost of "shallow" maintenance
should remain comparatively low, although individual repair
parts costs (especially electronic) may continue to be high.
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be performed by the ships force. 1 Although, as previously
noted, the manpower for these repairs is "free", the repair
parts are not* 2 The ship, when originally constructed, was
outfitted with a stock of spare parts placed in storerooms
under the custody of the Supply Officer, 3 As a part is drawn
out, it must be replaced. In the Cruiser-Destroyer Force,
1
In the event of a major casualty, the ship mi^ht
require the assistance of outside help, such as a yard or
tender. Funds for this purpose are again provided "free" by
the type or fleet commander.
2
In some cases, repair parts are "free" to the user,
and this is an area of considerable controversy. In general,
"free** issue parts are those which are very costly, or of a
replacement (turn-in one, draw one) type. Infra . » Chapter III.
3
The determination of what repair parts to carry
aboard ship is, obviously, one requiring a technical judgment.
In the initial provisioning of the ship, the determination is
based on an Allowance Parts List (APL) prepared by the technical
bureau for each equipment or component. These APL'a, in turn,
reflect the technical judgment of the bureau and the manufactur-
er as to the likelihood of failure of the part, the importance
of the part to the functioning of the equipment, and, to some
extent, the size and cost of the part. The APL's are, in turn,
merged into a Coordinated Ship # s Allowance List CC03AL) for
each ship. In the merging process, duplicate requirements for
the same part are noted, and the overall quantity carried is
reduced. As the ship is placed in service and begins to
accumulate experience, it becomes evident that some parts are
being used more frequently than others, and others not as
frequently. Thus, the Supply Officer may, if he experiences
two demands for a part not originally stocked, add that part
to his allowance. Further, during each overhaul, the inventory
is purified by a Supply Overhaul Assistance Program (SOAP), and
the allowed quantity of items not being used is reduced, while
the allowed quantity of frequently demanded items is raised.
It is clear that many technical judgments must be s.ade through-
out the whole repair parts process. It should also be clear
that many of the parts carried are there for "insurance" and
may never be used. Thus, the business criteria of stock
turnover cannot be strictly applied.
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Atlantic, this replacement is "free" to the ship, but i3
charged to funds held by the type commander. Furthermore,
there are restrictions as to the number of parts which may be
purchased, 1 In the Pacific Cruiser-Destroyer force, these
parts must be funded by the ship.
In addition to repair parts, items of equipment
(equipage) must also be occasionally replaced. Some of these
items were part of the original ship's allowance of equipage,
and were lost, damaged, or destroyed. Such items include foul
weather clothing, life jackets, test equipment, end hand tools.
Other items were not furnished originally, but mist be provided,
such as flashlights.
In carrying out operations, numerous supplies are
consumed . Food and commissary pi^ovisions are provided "free"
to the ship, and funded by the Military Personnel, Navy
Appropriation. However, the Supply Officer must keep careful
account of the amount of provisions consumed, since the ship
is allowed & specific dollar amount per man-day which it must
not exceed over a month's time. Other consumable supplies,
*The CruJDesL&nt system is unique in the Havy^ and is
discussed further in Chanter TTT, The basic assumption is
that, since the repair parts are a part of the "capital" of the
ship, they must be maintained, and should not eonpete with other
non-capital lt«*S for a share of the ship's scarce dollar re-
sources. Thus, a destroyer is required to replace repair parts
as they are drawn. Specifically, if the item is a "selected"
iter; (one which has experienced three or more demands during
an overhaul to overhaul cycle), it is replenished whenever the
"low" stock liisit is reached, to a pre-conputcu "high" limit
(based on usage). Other "non-selected" repair parts are
replaced on a one for one basis, while parts not normally stocked
/ not be ordered except for immediate use (unless they qualify
for addition to the ship's allowance).
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such as paper, cleaning supplies, paint, ra^s, and pencils
must bo paid for from the ship's funds.
Another cost of operations is ammunition. Each destroyer
is required to maintain a specified amount of OAttunltlen on board*
Sane of the ammunition may be used in the course of training,
and hence must be replaced. The cost of ammunition is "free* to
the ship, and is funded by the Other Procurement, Navy, and
Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles, Navy appropriations.
Here again, the CO is subject to a restraint in terms of number of
rounds (units) of ammunition allowed for training per period,
However, the dollar-cost is born by a Mavy-wide allotment.
Periodically, although normally during overhaul, some
of the ship's equipment will be replaced with newer equipment.
Although this represents an alteration of the capital structure,
and should be considered apart fro® the costs of maintaining
and operating the entity, the action has immediate ramifications
on operating &n<i maintenance co3ts. It will require an adjustment
of the repair parts carried, &n<l of the test equipment and tools
carried, as well as the personnel skills required. Furthermore,
it will alter the balance of repair parts usage, and hence cost.
For most destroyers, this means that, at any given moment, they
are operating with some piece(s) of equipment that are less than
a year old, which means, in turn, they do not have valid exper-
ience or usage data for it. The implications of this problem
are explored in the next section,
A final category of operating costs are those which
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are most commonly called services. In some ports, particularly
seldom visited ones, the ship must pay pilot end wharfage fees.
In addition, such miscellaneous costs as typewriter repairs,
long-distance telephone calls, and the cleaning of foul weather
fcear all must be paid for* All of these services are purchased
with ship's funds, and represent a real cost. In addition,
naval bases provide services to iihips in port which are "free".
These include pilots* utilities to ships tied up, tu«s, and the
maintenance of piers and moorings. These services, while "free"
to the user, are funded froei the Operations and Maintenance
appropriation by the bureau of Ships.
As with personnel costs, it is evident that the CO
does not bear the bulk of the cost of maintaining and operating
the material aspects of his ship. But, as we ascend the organi-
zational scale, siore and more of the costs are translated into
dollars. Howevar, a^ain we must recognize that the CO must
still allocate resources, although, for the most part, he does
this in tanas of units of material rather than dollars.
Money
Although the ship commander is given many men and
material resources, his money resources are relatively small.
As previously mentioned, he must "buy" some types of supplies,
equipage , and services. To purchase these resources, he is
given a fund, on a semi-annual basis. This fund is furnished
by the type commander from funds made available under the
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budget title: Supplies and Equipage. The ship commander does
not receive an allotment of funds in the strict sense, 3 Instead,
he receives an Operating Target (OPTAR) which is, for all
practical purposes, a fund allotment against which he can draw
but which he should not exceed without prior approval. More
will be said about this fund management system in Chapter III,
The money allotcd to destroyers for Supplies and Equipage
(SEE) is only a small fraction of the total cost of opera t:
the ship. For example, the total operating cost of the program
element, Destroyers, for fiscal year 1963, amounted to about
$1,9** 0,000 per shin. The average S6E requirement for destroyers
in FY 19S3, was $1513,000 per ship. The ship's OPTAR represents
only slightly more than 61 of the estimated total cost of
operating and maintaining the ship, (See Figure 1), Thus, it
is clear that the bulk of resources managed by the commanding
officer of a destroyer Are managed in terms other than money.
Conclusions
The destroyer, as a budget entity, is a capital structure
designed to produce combat readiness. The task of the commanding
1Strict, that is, in the sense that it is net a legal
allotment of funds, and therefore over-expenditure will n.
result in a Section 8171 (Anti-Deficiency Act) violation .
2
'
Based on an Interview with w, F, Devine, budget
Officer, Office of the Comptroller, Navy Department, March,
1963, and the FY 1963 Supplies and Equipage budget b&ck-up









Operations and Maintenance $ 530,000
Procurement of Missiles 119 , 000
Procurement of Ammunition 96,000
Military Personnel 1»220»0QQ
Total 'llsWjodb
Average Supplies & Equipage Funds..Requested—Per Ship
DD types 79,000
DD (931 class) 86,000
DDG 234,000
DDR 9^000
Average, all types 123,000
S6E Funds as a per~cent of Total Operating Costs 6.3%
A
Derived by dividing total program element costs
(Destroyers) (listed under the appropriations; 06MN, PAHN,
OPN, MPN) by the number of ships in the program. The destroyer
program element includes DD, DDG, DDR, and AD types. Interview
with W. F. Devine, Budget Officer, Ships and Facilities, Office
of the Mavy Comptroller, Mavy Department, March, 1963.
b
Taken from the FY 1963 Supplies £ Equipage budget
back-up data submitted by the Bureau of Ships.
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officer is to use efficiently the resources provided hira in
order to maintain his capital , and maximize his combat readiness*
He is provided with resources in the for® of men, material, and
money, although most of his resources are allocated in non-dollar
units. Thus, as the Cosamanding Officer sees it, the cost of
maintaining and operating the ship is a relatively small dollar
cost, but a very large non-dollar cost. Therefore he, as with
most other combat unit CO»s, perceives himself as being mainly
in a non-dollar economy. It iti o*»ly at higfee? levels in the
organizational structure that the resource costs are translated
into dollar costs. The problem of the budget system appears,
therefore, to be to make smooth this transition from the dollar
to the non-dollar economy.
A phrase * stolen" from a talk given by RADM Lot
Ensey, U3N, Deputy Comptroller of the Navy, before the






Our study of the destroyer as an entity indicated that
money resources were the least important, from the perspective
of the Commanding Officer, Nevertheless, these resources play
an extremely important role in the larger task of "buying" combat
readiness. In this part, we shall examine the methods by which
the Supplies and Kquipage budget is formulated and executed,
and inquire into some of the current problems in this area*
Supplies and Equipage In the Context of the
Navy iiudp.et
Honey is appropriated to the Navy under five "functional"
titles: Military Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, Procure-
ment, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, and Military
Construction.* As noted in Figure 1 (Chapter II), the true
costs of operating and maintaining a destroyer &re spread through
«»«————mull Mill II——————— i l tttmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm^ma MM)—— ——W—I—WWW—
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U. S,, Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller,
Navy .Budget Digest* Fiscal Year 1963 , Navy publication No»




the Military Personnel, Operations and Maintenance (06MN), and
to a lesser extent, the Procurement accounts. However, Supplies
and Equipage (S£E) funds are contained in the OSMN appropriation.
This appropriation is subdivided into nine "major activities",
one of which is "Ships and Facilities". 1 In accordance with navy
practice, these major activities follow navy organisational lines.
In other words, each of the major activities is assigned for
management purposes, to one of the Navy bureaus or offices.
Thus, to the extent that the navy department is organized along
"program" lines, so is the budget. The major activity, Ships
and Facilities, is assigned for management control to the Bureau
of Ships, This major activity is, in turn, broken down into
eight "Budget Activities", Among these activities is "Maintenance
and Operation of the Active Fleet" .^ Each budget activity is
further divided into "budget projects" and sub-projects. It is
important to note that budget review by higher authority (i.e.,
Department of Defense and Bureau of the Budget) is carried down
to the budget project level. So, also, is budf.et apportionment.
—H
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1
Ibid,, p. 58, The others: General Expenses, Navy
Personnel , Weapons and Facilities, Medical Care, Civil
Engineering, Servicewide Supply, Servicewide Operations,
Naval Petroleum reserves, and Military Family Housing,
2
Interview with the Head, Maintenance fiudpet Branch,
Office of the Bureau of Ships Comptroller, February, 1963.
The other Budget Activities mrei Active Fleet Alterations
and Improvement®, Technical Support Activities, Polaris,
Maintenance and Operation of Naval Reserve Training Vessels,




Thus, detailed justification (back-up data) must be prepared and
presented by the Bureau of Ships, broken down to budget project
details, to the Navy Coajptroller, the Defense Comptroller, and
the Bureau of the Budget, as well as to the appropriations
committees of congress. In turn, the funds, once appropriated,
are apportioned by the Bureau of the Budget and the Department
of Defense with the understanding that the taoney will be spent
in the manner described in the budget justification. 5- The
activity Maintenance and Operation of the Active Fleet is divided
into three "budget projects" • One of these is Supplies and
Equipage. 2 The breakdown of the navy budget to the S6E level
is presented graphically in Figure 2. The dollar significance
of S&E funds is shown by Figure 3. As can be seen, the SfcE
funds amounted to about 0.73% of the Jiavy budget in FY 1963.
Thus, we are dealing with a relatively modest portion of the
total navy budget, but one witn significant impact on the
operating forces.
Strictly speaking, only the bureau of the Budget
apportions appropriated funds. However, by law, the funds
must be approved by the Secretary of Defense before they can
be allocated and spent within the navy. Thus, the Secretary
of Defense can and does establish "reserves" on the money
apportioned by BOB. Such reserves oannot be spent. These
reserves, furthermore, are often established on very specific
budget items. For example, the FY 1963 apportionment of SEE
funds (a budget project) contained a reserve of 2.8 million
established by SecDef. Interview with the Head, Maintenance
Budget Branch, BuShips.
2





SUPPLIES AND EQUIPAGE, IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE NAVY BUDGETS
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, NAVV Appropriation
IPS AMD FACILITIES Major Activity
HAIKTEIJANCE AXB
OPERATION OF THE
ACTIVE FLEET Budget Activity
SUPPLIES
Aim
EQUIPAGE — — Budget Project
Source! Interview with the Head, Maintenance




















interview *ith Mr. V.F. Devine, Budget Officer,
Office of




The Supplies and Equipage budget is theoretically
"built-up" in the classic sense. That is t formulation begins
with an estimate by each individual ship commander, and these
estimates are successively merged and adjusted as the organiza-
tional chair, is ascended. It is worth mentioning, in passing
,
that this is the only segment of the entire Havy budget that
is directly contributed to in its preparation by ships of the
active fleet.
Budget preparation begins with the transmission of a
budget "call" from the Bureau of Ships, the money nonage** to
the Fleet Commanders . This call is for apportionment requests
for the forthcoming fiscal year, and budget requests for the
following fiscal year.^ The budget request calls for data
concerning fleet needs for the year beginning soma 18 months
hence. Thus the apportionment request, indicating as it does
fleet needs for the year beginning in six months, will contain
some modifications to the budget submission made the previous
year, based on more current information.
The budget call includes requests for justification data
for all three projects included under Operations and Maintenance
of the Active Fleet, namely: Scheduled Repairs (overhauls),
^•Interview with Hr. Paul Duda, office of the Fleet
Maintenance Assistant, Ships Division, Bureau of Ships, February,
1963. This office is the program manager for S6E funds.
2 For example, the call letter dated 28 January 1963, asks
for the apportionment request for FY 1964, and the budget
request for FY 1965.
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Ship Repairs (special availabilities), and Supplies and Equipage.
The format for the submission of the S8£ data is illustrated in
Figure U. In addition to this format, the call letter contained
general guidance concerning the budget requests. Included in
the general guidance - three points: (1) Any increase over
the previous year must be justified i (2) Advice that results of
past review by higher authority indicated that any increase
would have to be accompanied by a compensatory decrease in
another program) in4 (3) No increases were to be included for
anticipated labor or material cost increases,*
In the Atlantic fleet, the budget call is received by
the Fleet Fiscal Officer, an assistant to the Assistant Chief
of Staff, Logistics. In the Pacific fleet, the call is reaeived
by the Coauaander Service Force, Pacific, who acts as the fleet
logistics agent. The organisational relationships within the
Atlantic Fleet reflect the fact that the Operation and Mainten-
ance money is handled primarily by the same officers who are
responsible for ship overhauls and repairs, since about 72%
of the dollars are for this purpose. There is no comptroller
at the fleet level, and the size of the fiscal staff makes it
obvious that the handling of money is a secondary consideration.
1
Letter from Chief, bureau of Ships to Coriander
in Chief, U. £. Atlantic Fleet, serial 518U-17, dated 28





FORMAT FOR SUBMISSION OF SEE JUSTIFICATION DATA BY
FLEET COMMANDER TO BUREAU OF SHIPS*
C. Supplies and Equipage — FY 1963, 196H, 1965
C-l Operating and Maintenance Material for Ships Requirements
No. of Consufscsable Equipage Repair Parts Total Unit
Type Ships Supplies Replacement Replacement Cost
(1) (2)
Total Beginning Ending Ships Total
Cost Inventory Inventory Allowance Deficiencies
T3T UH (sdAP and
other)
(5)
C-II Flags and Commands
C-III Repairs to Other Vessels (6)
C-IV Service Craft and Docks
C~V Special Projects C Operations (7)
Notes! (Not included in original format)
(i) For destroyers^ these were: DD-FRAM HK I, DD f DDG, DDR, DDE.
(2) In terms of ship years (i.e. accounts for ships being
commissioned, and de-commissioned).
(3) Value of Beginning Inventory in dollars.
CO Value of items included in Ships Allowance, in dollars.
(5) Ending Inventory minus Allowance. SOAP refers to Supply
Overhaul program, which checks and "purifies" allowance
during overhaul.
(6) Cost of materials and services used by tenders in
repairing other fleet units.
(7) Such as Operation Deepfreeze, the support of the Antarctic
scientific expeditions. This item is included, since
soae costs isay be reiiabursed by the project sponsor.
aLetter from Chief, Bureau of Ships to Commander in
Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and Commander Service Force, U. S.
Paoific Fleet, serial 518B-17, dated 28 January 1963 (in the
files of the Bureau of Ships, code 518).
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closely related to ship Maintenance.
The Atlantic Fleet Commander in Chief , upon receipt
of the BuShips call letter, transmits a call to the type
commanders. Within the Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Atlantic, the
call is received in the Force Supply Officer 1 s office. Prior to
this time, and as a regular practice, each destroyer in the
force has submitted a semi-annual budget. These budget estimates
forecast the requirements (in dollars) for repair parts, and
other material. The material requirements are further broken
down to a specific list of proposed equipage replacements, and
habitability improvements, itemized and costed. These ships'
budget estimates are based on the past history of repair parts
usage and consumable supplies, and on known deficiencies of
equipage. They are forwarded to the type commander via the
squadron commander, who consolidates the requirements of his
squadron into a single budget, as well as forwarding each
ship's budget. 2 The budget justification data submitted in
response to the call is not, however, based directly in the
©hips' budgets. The staff estimates the dollar requirements,
based on past experience and a knowledge of new equipment
t mi w.wwi—
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*The fiscal staff in the Atlantic fleet consists of
one Supply Corps Commander as fiscal officer, and a Lieutenant
Commander as his assistant for maintenance funds. The program
in FY 1962 amounted to about 250 million.
2
Interview with LT Steve Lasarus, SC, USN, Assistant




scheduled to be installed, for each type and class of
destroyer in the force. These estimates are compared with the
ships' budgets for validation purposes, which are first
subjected to an averaging process. Since there are many of
each type of destroyer in the force, 1 the staff is in a good
position to determine average costs per ship. These estimates
are then transmitted to the fleet commander. 2
The fleet fiscal officer, upon receipt of the estimates
from the various type commanders, reviews the justification data
submitted. The review consists, mainly, of comparison of
projected costs against current costs, and an examination of
the justification for any increases. Any increases that are
not justified are returned to the type commander for further
justification, or reduction. After approval by the fleet
commander, the estimates are forwarded to BuShips.
At the Bureau of Ships, the budget submissions of the
two fleets are examined by the program manager (Fleet Maintenance
Assistant) in a manner similar to that at the fleet commander
level. In addition, the estimates for each type of ship must be
XThere were, In 1363, 138 W/DL types in the force.
In the case of the newer missile and nuclear types, the
averaging process is not yet too valid.
2
In CruDesLant, the SSE estimates are prepared by
the Supply Officer, and the Overhaul and Repair estimates
are prepared by the Material Officer. All estimates are
approved by the Type Commander before bcinp, forwarded,
3
Interview with CDR A. D. Suslick, SC, USN, Fiscal
Officer, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, March 1963.

averaged, to produce a single estimate for each type, 1 The
budget is then further reviewed in the BuShips Comptroller's
office. At this point, "ceilings", in the form of what
budget analysts further up the line are likely to "buy" are
applied* These "ceilings" are a touchy point, and are not
ceilings in the strict sense* Rather, they represent what the
budget analysts think is the jaaximum figure that will survive
further budget review. The justification for the procedure
is that it keeps the cuts under the control of the bureau,
rather than opening up the budget to cuts by an "outsider"
,
presumably with less knowledge of the problems. The BuShips
review of the budget estimates also includes an adjustment to
the ship-year figures submitted by the fleets. Based on the
most recent information from the Chief of Naval Operations, the
bureau is in a better position to determine how many of each
type of ship will be in the fleet during the budget year.
Further, throughout the entire review process, the BuShips
Comptroller personnel work closely with the CNO appropriation
sponsor, the DCNO, Logistics, Assistant for Ships Material
Readiness. The final budget is submitted by BuShip3 in the fens
indicated in Figure S. These estimates are forwarded to the
Interview with Mr. Duda. One of the unexplained
mysteries of the budget is why, consistently, the Pacific
Fleet and Atlantic StE estimates for the same type of ship
are significantly different.
2
Interview with Mr. William Whalen, Maintenance Budget




FORMAT FOR SUBMISSION OF S&£ JUSTIFICATION DATA dY
BUREAU OF SHIPS TO OFFICE OF THE NAVY COMPTROLLER*
Supplies and Equipage
1. Ships Quarterly Allotments
— For FY 1962, 1963, 1964 —
Cost per Ship
Type Ship Years per Year Total
2. Flags and Commands
3. Repairs to Other Vessels
H. Service Craft and Docks
5. Special Projects and Operations
6* Support of CVS assigned to CNATRA
7. SOAP deficiencies (Range) (1)
8. Assistance to Allied Forces (Except MAP)
Deduct, Anticipated Reimbursements. (2)
Kotes (Not a part of original document)
(1) Indicates deficiencies found during Supply Overhauls,
funded for item ran^e only (not stock depth, as Eight
be indicated in the ships allowance).
(2) Largely, reimbursements from NASA for Project Mercury.
Budget document in the files. Maintenance budget
Branch, Bureau of Ships Comptroller, for FY 19S«i budget
submission. See also Figure **•

office of the Wavy Comptroller and thence to review by
higher authority • * It is the responsibility of the Chief,
Bureau of Ships, and the DCtfO Logistics to defend the budget
before congress.
Budget Execution
As has already been noted, the Bureau of Ships receives
the fleet apportionment requests along with the budget requests
for the following year. Thus, the justification data for
apportionment are identical with those for budget submission,
as are the procedures. The Bureau of Ships receives the
apportionment of Supplies and Equipage funds via the Secretary
of Defense and the Navy Comptroller. Although the BOB alloca-
tion is wade at the appropriation level (Operation and Mainten-
ance, Navy, in this case), OSD may establish a reserve at the
budget project level, as may the Navy Comptroller. 2 Upon
receipt of the budget apportiora&ent and allocation, BuShips
sub-allocates the SSK funds to the two fleet commanders, basing
the amount on a pro-rata share of the amount received from
BGB-SeeDef-NavCompt. BuShips does not establish any reserves
at the bureau level* The funds are sub-allocated to the fleets
» II ll' Illll I II < H ill II H I ll»l>M»l«W»MM«r«M«*M<»»M»»«»««l I I —M—MfJ—
>
^Specifically , Ihe ciiain of review is J fcavCuikpt,
CHO Advisory Board, SecNav, SecDef/30B, Congress.
2 In FV 1963, OSD established a reserve of 2.8 million
in 3SE funds, which was maintained until December, 1SC2. The
general practice of the ftavy Comptroller is to pass on as much
flexibility to the bureaus as has been given it by OSD.




at the budget activity level (i.e., Operation end Maintenance
of the Active Fleet), but OSD restrictions may serve effectively
to isolate the funds into the three distinct budget projects.
For example, in FY 1963, restrictions were in effect on the
dollar amount of overhaul and repairs that could be accomplished
in Navy and private shipyards, as well as the aforementioned
reserve on SSE funds. Thus, the budget activity was sub-allocat-
ed in three segments: Qverhaulu and Repairs, navy shipyards;
Overhauls and Repairs, private shipyards} and Supplies and
Equipage. This pives the fleet commanders virtually no
flexibility, since they cannot readily transfer funds between
the three budget projects. Finally, it should be noted that
this sub-allocation of funds for Operation and Maintenance of
the Active Fleet, amounting to about 0.7% of the tot#l navy
budget, and about *% of the O&MN budret, represents the only
funds given directly to the operating forces to manage. The
fleet commanders also receive allotments of funds for fleet
travel and administrative expenses from other budget activities,
but they do not directly administer these funds as they do the
Operation and Maintenance of the Active Fleet funds.
At the fleet commander level, the fiscal officer receives
the sub-allocation of S6£ funds and, in turn, issues allotments
to the type commanders. Current practice is to provide all of
the funds requested for the FBM submarines (Polaris), and to
pro-rate the rest among the type commanders on the basis of

<*6
the apportionment requests.* These allotments create a le*>,al
obligation on the type commander to not over-obligate the
fund® alloted, under the penalties of Section 367 9 (The Anti-
Deficiency statute)* The Fleet coamanuer generally holds back
a small amount of funds, about 0.5% in FY 1963, 2 in the initial
quarterly allotment. This reserve is subsequently used to
make adjustments to the various type eommandern funds as the
need arises throughout the year. The fleet fiscal officer keeps
track of his funds through the monthly allotment status reports
which are submitted for each typo commander by the Navy Regional
Finance Office, Norfolk. The fleet commander makes every effort,
throuch messages and informal communications with type command-
ers, to ensure that all funds alloted are obligated prior to
the end of the fiscal year.
At the type commander level, procedure for fund aanage*
raent varies. Most type commanders, on the basis of the amount
of funds received, and the individual ships budget requests,
issu** Operating T«Fgeti (OPTAR's) to each ship on a quarterly
basis. These OPTAR's, although not a legally binding allotment
of funds, are considered by the ship's commanding officer to be
a fund ceiling, which may ziot be over-expended without prior
augmentation from the type commander. However, the Cruiser -
Destroyer Force, Atlantic, uses a novel system of fund management
^Interview with Cdr Suslick. in FY 1963, about 81% of





which is apparently unique in the fleet. In CruDesLant, a
portion of the SIS funds are held back by the type commander
to provide a source of funds for replacing repair parts by
individual ships* The remainder of the funds are assigned to
the several squadrons of the force as OPTAR's. These OPTAP.'s
are for the purpose of funda'nr «)2 items other than repair
parts » and ax*® allocated by the Squadron Cosnander to the
individual ships Mi the basis of their budget requests* Both
the type couunander and the squadron commanders establish small
reserves at the beginning of the year, but those are distributed
prior to the ®n<l of the year* 1 A portion of the S6E funds are
also assigned to the Destroyer Tenders, both for their own
self-support, and for the repair of other vessels. Finally,
a portion of the S62 funds are retained by the type commander
to fund the expenses of the stuff, and to fund certain equipment
and services which are used in common by all ships of the force.
Figure 6 indicates the distribution of SSE funds within
Co&CruPesLant for FY 1963. The intended purpose of the system
of furnishing repair parte en ft "free" basis to individual ships
is to ensure that all ships of the force maintain their repair
parts inventories at their present levels* Based en
experience, the type commander believes that the individual
ship commander should not have to make the "trade-off" decision
between using his limited funds tc replace a repair part, or to
buy some other Item* Through the use of this system, the type
» " I " i ——»». m i 1111 llll »1 Illl Ill III I l| I II









Other Uses 28 **
Total Ships Requirements
Repair of Other Vessels
Tender Self-Support











(i) lieId as an open allotment at the type commander
level for the use of all ships*
(2) Assigned to each ship as an OPTAR, via the
Squadron Coasaander*
(3) Insufficient funds were received in FY 1963 to permit
ComCruDesLant to fund any of the allowance
deficiencies developed during supply overhauls.
^Interview with Lt. Steve Lasarus, SC t USN, Assistant




commander can assure himself that the repair parts allowance
is maintained at its present level. 1 This peiicy does not
amount to a "blank check", as it might appear. Force instruc-
tions provide specific guidelines as to what a repair part is,
which ones may be ordered, in what quantities, and how often. 2
Although the system is relatively new in its present form, the
type commander has been able to estimate repair parts demand
with sufficient accuracy that it has not (yet) been necessary
to recapture OPTAR funds to "beef up" the repair parts fund, or
to place a limitation on the availability of the repair parts
fund. As with the fleet commander, the type commander also
makes every effort to ensure that alloted funds are obligated
before the end of the fiscal year. Specifically, on 1 June,
ComCruDesLant sends a message to all CG*s requiring them to
bring their routine spending to a close within the next 15
days. On IS June, the type commander restricts the use of the
repair parts fund for routine use, and requires all urgent
needs to be cleared with the type commander before being
purchased from the supply system. An additional cushion is
provided the type commander through the recapture of credits.
Credits are received by the type commander for material turned
back into the supply system by all ships in the force. The
interview with Capt. D. C. McNeill, SC, USN, Foroe
Supply Officer, Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U. S. Atlantic
Fleet, March, 1963.
^U. S., Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U. S. Atlantic
Fleet, Instruction 7303,9(5, Administration and Accounting for
Operation Funds for Fiscal Year 1^5^ » ^0 July 1962. See, also.
note 1, p. 26.
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type commander redistributes these funds on the basis of rnted t
as indicated by individual ship requests. Although the fact
that a particular ship generated the credit by turning in
material will be taken into consideration in redistributing
funds, the overall needs of the force come first, 1 Since not
all of the credits become known to the type commander until late
in the fiscal year, this has come to represent a cushion which
the type commander can count on to avoid last-minute over-
obligation or expenditure of funds* However, the problem of
credits can be a bone of contention, as is noted in the next
section of this chapter.
Individual ships receive their GPTAR's on a quarterly
basis, although they receive planning information which
indicates what the total annual amount will probably be. Prior
to receipt of the OPTAR, the ship has prepared a semi-annual
budget, or financial plan, listing by month, anticipated
expenditures for repair parts, equipage replacement, habitability
improvements, and other items (consumable supplies, etc.).
On some ships, each department develops its budget, the sum of
all of them representing the ship's budget. In such cases,
it is common to have some form of reserve, held by the commanding
officer, to be used to cover unanticipated problems. In other
ships, the supply officer holds all funds and, in effect, issues
everything "free 1* to the using departments. In CruDesLant, it
i i n » i i i ii i i n ii m i i i m » 'i i i i . p
Interview with Lt. Lazarus.
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is becoming increasingly common for the supply department to
stock and issue all common use consumable supplies. Under this
system, the departments budget only for their particular
(peculiar) requirements, while the supply officer budgets for
all common use items on a ship-wide basis. Regardless of the
system, the ship regards the OPTAB as an allotment of funds, in
the sense that it rsay not be over-expended. Although the
Commanding Officer can request the Squadron Commander for an
a ugmentation if a particularly urgent need arises, there is a
natural reluctance to do this, since it is perceived by many
CO's as a sign of poor management, or a lack of "can-do" spirit.
Furthermore, since repair parts are "free", most other require-
ments can b© deferred without immediate impact on the ships
combat readiness. 1 As is apparent, the principal "money manager"
aboard most destroyers is the Supply Officer. He keeps the
records of funds obligated, and furnishes the department heads
with their current unexpended balances. Since repair parts
are "free", the department heads tend to concern themselves
principally with shortages of physical material rather than money.
This is not to say, however, that the department heads do not
have to take dollar constraints into their resource allocation
decisions. Dollar trade-offs are constantly being made at the
m ill nn . n .,111. m i ii » i———
—
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Perhaps a better term would be "noticeable" impact
on combat readiness. Many destroyers today are operating
without their full allowance of life jacket*, foul weather
clothing, and in some cases, life rafts. These items, while




working level. In CruDesLant ships, the supply officer maintains
a Daily Expenditure Analysis Ledger in which are posted the
daily supply transactions. Included in the posting is a material
distribution code which enables the supply officer to summarize
his transactions with respect to type and end use, A monthly
report is made to the type commander, summarizing expenditures
for the month and year to date. This monthly summary is broken
down to show the money value of requisitions issued for repair
parts, equipage, and other. Alongside these totals are the
budget amounts for comparison purposes. In addition, the report
contains a summary of the monthly and cumulative to-date money
value of issues as compared with the money value of obligations
for stocked repair parts. Since a repair part should be ordered
(obligated) whenever one is issued from stock, these two amounts
should roughly match.* Xf they do not match, the ship is either
adding to inventory or living off the shelf. The daily expen-
diture analysis ledger is very close to being a true "cost*
accounting record, since it records issues to ultimate users. 3
Roughly match, because for some items a re-order
is not placed until a low limit is reached, rather than on
a one for one basis.
U. S., Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U. S.
Atlantic Fleet, Instruction ***m0.2C, Central Inventory
Hanagement in Destroyer Type Ships . 4*" ay 1951, and U. S. f
domCrube&Lant Inst 73 03.9G.
3
This is not always the case, however. Material may
be demanded by the user which is not in stock and must be
ordered. Further, many consummable supplies are ordered in
bulk and issued to users as needed. However, with some care in
summarizing, and within limits, the cost of issues in a given
time period can be obtained.

S3
On the basis of this ledger, the ship's Supply Officer can
prepare various types of analyses to indicate supply system
effectiveness, and to analyze cost oontrol by the various
departments. In addition, the type coaimander can use the
monthly reports to prepare similar types of analyses. Figure 7
is an analysis of the expenditures made from OPTAR funds from
a sample of CruDesLant ships. It must be remembered that OPTAR
fund© granted to individual ships represents only about 28% of
the total SEE funds received by the type com^-snder, whereas
**free" repair parts expenditures account for more than half the
funds. * In addition to the monthly report, the ship raust
correspond directly with the Navy Regional Finance Office,
Morfolk, in order to reconcile any differences over erroneous
charges, &n& other transactions that affect the amount obligated.
As with the fleet commander, the type commander receives a
monthly allotment status report from the ftRFO which is his
basic tool to avoid over-obligating his funds.
Current Problems>> i m ill *»immmmim^mMmmmmmmmtm»mmmmmm
The fund management system for SSK funds has been
described in soae detail in order to place in context the
problems that currently exist in this area. In this section,
we shall consider the problems "in the small**. That is, the
problems that exist within the basic SEE fund area. In Chapter
IV, we shall examine the problems **in the large ** and look at
<MHMMMWMmM




EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS OF OPTAR FUNDS GRANTED TO DESTROYERS*
Based on a five ship (DD) sample over a five month period,






Deck £ Seamanship Materials 12.3
(Line, Deck Treads, etc.)
Paint & Related Products 11.
S
Personnel Requirements 5.8








Total Consumable Supplies 82.9%
Equipage
Total Equipage 17.1
(Fire hose, life preservers,
telephone head sets, etc.)
Total OPTAR fund expenditures 100.0%
EXPEMDITURE ANALYSIS OF S&E FUNDS FOR SHIPS REQUIREMENTSb
Including OPTAR funds, and Repair Parts expenditures
made by individual ships against Type Commanders Allotment.
Repair Parts 63%






» i — —«—mi i n i
aU. S., Cosnaander Cruiser Destroyer Force, U. S. Atlantic
Fleet, Compilation of Supplies and Equipage Expenditures in
in USd Ulanriy (DD 9U3) . U35 WarrinRton (DP 8M3)» USS Sperry
(DP 697). IJSS Inaraha*a (DP 6MH). and USS 2.;>. Roberts (DP H23 ),
11 December 1962 (in the files of the Force Supply Officer,
COMCRUDESLANT)
.
^Interview with Lt Steve Lazarus.
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the destroyer not purely from the standpoint of S*E funds, but
rather as an economic entity.
Because we are examining the S6C problem "in the snail* t
this does not mean the problems are small. As perceived by the
users, the problem is: not enough money. As perceived by the
budget analysts, the problem is: not enough justification.
Figure 8 illustrates the S*E problem as the fleet sees it. As
shown, the fleets have been receiving about 90-95% of what they
request as a result of OSD budget review. It must be remembered,
however, that the 5% cut is greater than the amount being spent
by ships on equipage replacement.*
Figures S and 10 relate the SEE funding to the size and
composition of the fleet, and of CruDesLant. Figure 11 illus-
trates the increasing level of expenditures required to support
the n«M^r missile ships in CruDesLant. As can be seen in Figure
11, a 931 class DD costs $2**, 000 more than a 692 class DD
(27.5% increase), and a DD<3 (destroyer, guided nissile) costs
$81,000 more (83% increase). In other words, the newer, more
sophisticated warships are substantially more expensive to
operate than the World War II types, which still make up the
bulk of the destroyer force However, as indicated in Figure 10,
the funds made available per ship have actually declined slight-
ly, although the proportion of the force which is missile
equipped (DD6, BLG, etc.) hats increased almost two fold in just




SUPPLIES AND EQUIPAGE BUDGET HISTORY—DESTROYERS*
Dollars per ship—in thousands
FY I960 1961 1962 1963 1964
MMMWWVM* !—— .iw MMHHMM MMMMMMB —-
Fleet Request
(Per Ship) $80 $76 $84 $87 $87
President's Budget 67 7S 79 79 80
(Per Ship)
% of Fleet Request
Approved after
OSD/BOB review 84% 99% 94% 91% 92%
Data furnished by Mr, Robert Nicholas, Maintenance
Budget Branch, Office of the BuShips Comptroller, February
1963. The figures are derived by dividing the total dollars
requested for DD types by the number of ship-years in the




A COMPARISON OF THE SIZE OF THE ACTIVE FLEET, AND
SUPPLIES AHD EQUIPAGE FUHDS GRANTED FOR ALL SHIP TYPESa
Dollars per ship—in thousands
FY 1960 1961 1962 1963
Ho, of Ships in
the Active Fleet If* 817 898 862
% of ships Kinaile
Equipped1 1.7% <t«2% 5.3% 7.5%
SSE Funds Granted
Per Ship $113 $128 $126 $132












Not© (1): Missile equipped ships include only Anti-Air
jaissiles (Surface to Air) and Fleet Ballistic
Missiles (Polaris).
aCompiled froasj U. 5., Department of the Navy, Office
of the Comptroller, Navy Budget Digest, Fiscal Years 1960-1963
.
Navy publication Ho. HAVEXOS P-13iS} Interview witn Hr. W. F.
Devine, March, 1963; and Interview with Hr. Robert Bailey,
ProftraRuaing Office, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations




A COMPARISON OF THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE CRUISER-DESTROYER
FORCE, ATLANTIC, AMD SUPPLIES AMD EQUIPAGE FUNDS GRANTED
Dollars—in thouaanda
FY I960 1961 1962 1963
Total Ship-Years
in the Force 144.5 143.6 151.0 164.2
% of Shins Miaaile
Equipped1 0.35% 2.5% 7.3% 14.4%
ifB Funds Granted $16,600 $16,900 $17,700 $19,200
S&E Funds Granted,
Per Ship $115 $118 $117 $116
Index of Growth of
Missile Equipped
proportion of Force
(1S62 i 100) ft 34 100 199
Index of Growth of
SSE Funds Granted
Per Ship
(1962 100) 98 100.5 100 99.5
Note (l)t Missile Equipped includes only Anti-Air missiles.
U. S., Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U. S.
Atlantic Fleet, Annual Combatant Supplies and Equipa&e
Allocations .and Expenditures. ComCruDes ant , (In the files
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^Source—Interview with Lt. Steve Lazarus, Assistant Force




one year, From the point of view of the operating forcee, then,
adequate funds are not being provided to maintain the growing
population of increasingly expensive shins.
Another aspect of the fund shortage problem is the
growth of allowance deficiencies. In type commands not using
the CruDesLant "free issue" repair parts system, ships frequently
find themselves unable to pay for a repair part in order to
replace the one taken off the shelf. This leads to a gradual
H eat down'* of on board inventory. The Atlantic Fleet estimated
that allowance deficiencies amounted to 13 million in FY 1962 t
and further estimated that deficiencies would reach 22 . S million
by the ^nd of FY 1963. * It was to arrest this problem that the
Supply Overhaul concept (SOAP) was initiated. 2 However,
CruDesLant has been able to fund deficiencies disclosed by
supply overhauls in FY 1S63, and has never been able to fully
fund these deficiencies. Thus, in the words of the Fleet
Commander
t
Readiness of the Fleet is bein^ progressively
degraded by the growing shortage of repair parts and
equipage, and tc a lesser degree, consumable material
aboard ship. These ehortsp.es result from insufficient
SSL funds to procure the required inventory to fill
allowance and/or meet minimum levels of support
established by the Fleet Commander.
2
Since the problem appears to be clear at the fleet
level, why have not additional funds been forthcoming? The
m . ..i n iimi i in i n nr I in - i urn m ill i in < i m i ii .
1
Supra
. , p. 25, note 2.
2
Letter from Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet,
dated 30 August If 62.
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answer, according to Navy budget analysts, is insufficient
justification data, 1 Instead of lump sum figures, DOD budget
analysts want specific information as to the nature and extent
of the deficiencies. For example, in reviewing the FY 196**
Navy budget, DOD indicated a desire to knowj (1) specific
deficiencies by item* (2) the value of existing shipboard inven-
tories! (3) tht annual consumption of supplies ; and (H) items
in the inventory in long supply. Underlying these requests are
two basic questions posed by OSD: (1) How valid are the allowance
lists (i.e., the inventory "requirements") ; and (2) What part
of the annual SSE expenditures &r^ going to "nonessential"
expenditures. 2 It is clear that, in order to supply this kind
of detail, individual ships must keep records in much greater
detail than at present. Yet, the Atlantic Fleet Commander
stated t "There is no practical cost accounting method available
to determine the 'mix' among the uses for SEE funds, and to
establish the true rata at which operating costs are accrued."
Thus, the dilemma appears to be "how to get more funds without
doing wore accounting"?
A further aspect compounding the 36E fund management
1
Interview with Mr. W. F. Devine, Budget Officer,
Office of the Navy Comptroller.
2
In the course of conversation with a number of persons
familiar with DOD budget review, the nest suspect itero* appear
to be rugs and plus furniture for officers quarters.
3
Letter from Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet,
dated 30 Au$^ust 1962.
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problem is that of material turn-in credits. Although
seemingly a small factor, credits may amount to more than 10%
of a given month's expenditures* 1 These credits generate
several significant fund ^anagewsent problems. A conuaon concept
in fund Ranagenent is to review obligation rates. Both BuShips
&nd higher authority keep track of the fleet obligation rate
of S6E funds, and tend to use this as a measure of need t the
theory bein*< that if the money isn't beinj* spent, it probably
isn't needed. Thus, logic would indicate that fleet SST funds
should be spent roughly proportionately over time, so that half
of the funds would Ye obligated half way through the year. 2
However, in FY 18f>3, at ciid-year, less than half of fleet S&L
funds had been obligated y causing higher review authorities to
raise the question of whether a true shortage of funds actually
exists. Figure 12 indicates the Atlantic Fleet obligation rate
for 1962 and 1363. It is clear that at fiiid-ye&r, 1963 obliga-
tions amounted to 47% of the planning figure* however, the
fleet had actually spent a greater ajaount than this, the
differ the result of credits. This occurs IMMMUU
under Navy accounting; procedures, the amount of funds obligated
"educed by the amount of credits due, to arrive at the net
i i m iii - - - - i - -- — -— ._ - . — . . - . . . - - . —
Interview with Lt. Steve Lazarus. A turn-in credit
is created when a ship returns usable material to the supply
aysteu and is given credit for it. This credit does not,
however, &o to the ship, but, rather, to the type commander.
Supra
. , p. 47.
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Source: Interview with CDH A.D. Suslick, SC, U5N, Fiscal Officer,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, March, 1963.

ft*
amount obligated.^- For example, Figure 13 indicates the rates
of obligation experienced in CruDesLant, before and after
allowance for credits. Thus, although the funds are being
spent at a slightly greater than straight line rate, the
obligation rate reviewed by higher authority indicates a com-
pletely different story. Furthermore, "towards the end of each
Fiscal Year many bonafide fleet requirements are cancelled
because end use funds cannot be obligated for these items before
the end of the Fiscal Year.** 2 In FY 1962, for example, the
Atlantic Fleet had unobligated funds amounting to $700,000
(slightly more than 1% of the year's total funds) due largely
to the late receipt of credits. The net effect of these
procedures is to discourage to some extent the turning in of
material not needed, and to deny to the fleet the use of all
their $€£ funds.
Conclusions
It seems clear that a solution of our "problem in the
small*' lies in an improved accounting system and better budget
justification data from the fleet. As already noted, 3 SuShips
is presently calling for additional data to be submitted with
«—mm——
—
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As reported on the Allotment Status report (NavCorapt
2025) prepared by the regional finance office.
Letter from Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet,
dated 30 August 1962.
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*Intarviaw with LT Stava Lazarus, SC, USN, Assistant Supply
Officer, Cruiaar-Daatroyar Forca U.S. Atlantic Flaet, March, 1963.
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the budget request for FY 1965, These date will include, by
type of ship, the value of the beginning and ending inventory
and of the ship's allowance, thereby defining the deficiency
in a more specific manner than heretofore. In the opinion of
the Atlantic Fleet Fiscal officer, these data can be obtained,
although considerable effort will be required from the ships
supply officer. However, it is the author 1 s conclusion that
there is considerable doubt in the mind of fleet supply person-
nel as to the definition of "inventory"• The ship's allowance
lists include not only repair parts, but also iteas of equipage
and consumable supplies. These latter two categories are not
usually in the custody of the ship's supply officer, and avq
not included in most shipboard stock records. In ComCruDesLant
,
items of equipage and consumable supplies are not being included
in the inventory value being prepared for BuShips. The inven-
tory problem is further complicated by the feet that many items
in the ship's allowance are not priced. For example, many ships
repair parts are one of a kind, and are manufactured at the time
the ship is built* These parts are not carried in the supply
system and are not priced in the ships allowance. In addition,
equipage items are usually not priced in the allowance lift, and
are frequently not carried in the supply system. Thus, in order
for a ship adequately to evaluate its inventory, it must:
^Interview with CDR Suslick.
interview with CAPT McNeill.
About 17% of ships parts are in this non-priced
category. Interview with CDR Suslick.
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(1) define what Items in the allowance are to be in the
"inventory" | <2) Estimate a price (cost) for each non-priced
iteiaj (3) Physically inventory all items not accounted for by
perpetual inventory cards i (**) Extend and total the costs of
all material listed in the stock record cards and found in the
physical inventory (over 15,000 repair part items alone for
BD^)* (5) Similarly extend and total the costs of all items
in the allowance* Since these steps must be taken while
continuing to conduct normal ships business, and without special
staff
s
t it is easy to see that there has been and is considerable
inertia in carrying out the BuShips requirement, 1 *n spite of
these problems, however, the budget justification for FY 1965
will include detail not heretofore presented which may signi-
ficantly improve the chance that the fleet requests will not
be substantially cut.
1
CruDesLant believes that the type commander can
estimate the inventory value with reasonable accuracy on the
basis of the last SOAP inventory report. However, this estimate
assumes that, because of the "free issue" repair part system,




CONCLUSIONS t THE PROBLEM IN THE LARGE
Introduction
In the words of the Commander in Chief t Atlantic
Fleet:
It appears that some basis must be found for
resolution of the Fleet problem* . . • A workable
material management system that will reflect true
consumption and eliminate abuses brought about by
the existing methods of SSE funding is needed • *
Towards this end, several proposals have been put
forward which go well beyond the problem of better budget
justification data. These proposals attempt to come to grips
with the fundamental management problems of navy ships* In
this concluding part, we shall consider and analyse some of
these more basic approaches* These approaches include mainten-
ance management improvement, allowance list improvement, the
study of consumer funding, and increased use of automatic data
processing in logistics*
Maintenance M&na&fement
Underlyins the management of dollar resources aboard
ship is the problem of managing the purposes to which dollars
... . ——~_ , ,.,
,
. _ . , ...
Letter from Commander in Chief, U. S, Atlantic Fleet,




are put. Since the bulk of ship operating coats are directly
related to maintenance of equipment , it is clear that there is
a direct relationship -between improving maintenance management
and improving fund (dollar) management.
The Navy established a Fleet Work Study program in
I960.* The purpose of the program was to obtain more effective
use of men and material through the use of scientific work
study methods. As an outgrowth of an Air Force study of
maintenance , the Fleet Work Study groups began an intensive
effort to design and install an improved maintenance management
system in November 1S62. The heart of this system is the
development of specific maintenance requirements for each
component/ equipment/ system in a ship. From these requirements,
specific job cards are prepared which list the work to be done,
the way to do the job, equipment and tools needed, personnel
skills needed, and the normal time required to do the job.
In addition, a schedule is prepared listing the frequency of
performance required for each job. Through this systematic
approach, all levels of shipboard management will be able to
plan for, and more effectively control, scheduled maintenance.
1
*?h@ Fleet Work Study Program, 1* Naval TraininE Bulletin
.
Spring, 1SS3, p. 15.
2
Such a system does not, of course , "schedule" equipment
breakdowns. Although it is hoped that an improved ays ten of
preventive maintenance will greatly lessen the chance of
equipment failure, it has yet to be demonstrated that any
preventive maintenance system can substantially decrease
unanticipated failures of electronics equipment.
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The standard Wavy Maintenance Management System, now
being installed in the fleet, has two basia objectives:
A standard of maintenance planning and control
that will provide for the uniform accomplishment of
planned preventive maintenance • •
(and)
A system for collecting, processing, analyzing, and
distributing feedback information that will enable line
commanders and bureaus to carry out their management
functions In support of the operating forces.*
The implications of the Uniform Maintenance Data Collection
System for irr.proving financial management decisions are clear.
For the first time, a ship, and hence a type or fleet commander,
will be able to summarise all its requirements for scheduled
maintenance. The material requirements can, in turn, be
translated into dollar terms and budgeted for. Further, the
feedback of information to the technical bureaus should enable
them to make better decisions concerning what spare parts and
tools need to be carried aboard ship, as well as what kinds of
human skills. In addition, the system should indicate equipments
which are unreliable and in need of further engineering and de-
sign improvements. An important aspect of this reporting system
is that it will employ data processing equipment, and that the
reporting system will be a simplified, regularized task, initiated
by the technicians immediately after he does the job. The data
from this system will also greatly improve th« ability of the
supply system to predict item demand, thus lessening the
U, S., Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval
Operations, Standard Kavy Maintenance Management System ,
OPNAVINSTRUCTION ^700.16, 8 March 1963,
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probability of being out of stock. However t considerably roore
work must be done in designing the system before it can actually
be put to work* The target date for system definition is
April 196*4, with system installation scheduled for completion
by January 1966. l Up to this time, it does not appear that
financial management personnel from either SuShips or the Navy
comptrollers office have participated in the system design. It
is «!*£? that, if full utilization of the financial management
potential of this system is to be obtained, full participation
by the financial managers in the system design is essential.
Improving Allowance Lists




Underlying much of the current argument over S$£ funds
is the question of inventory value, and how much inventory is
really necessary. The preparation of allowance lists hinges
on the technical decision a© to whether or not a specific repair
part is sufficiently "important* to necessitate its being
carried on board ship. There is little argument that this
decision ought to rest on firm "scientific" ground, even thou
it must ultimately also include subjective judgments. This
judgment must begin with definition of the mission in which an
equipment/ system is to be employed. An assessment must then
be made of the importance of the system to the mission, the
components to the system, and individual parts to the components.
Based on these determinations ef the military worth of th<? p*rts,




the decision making goes forward with consideration of size,
cost, and probability of demand to yield the optimised allowance
list. This concept has led to the Optimum COSAL program,
which was established as a navy objective in I960. 1 The
Optimum COSAL envisions an allowance list specifically tailored
for each individual ship, based on the determination of the
military essentiality of each part/component/system as it
relates to the mission of the ship. This military essentiality
judgment is made through a composite evaluation by the manu-
facturer, the technical bureau, and the operating forces.
Included in the evaluation are such factors est the ability
of the ships force to replace the partj the effect of the part
on the operation of the component/ systems the availability of
alternative equipments to do the job (redundancy) j and the
effect of the inoperability of the equipment/system on the
mission. In order to make this last determination, some general
assumptions have to be made about the ship's mission (e.g.,
operating independently or in a task force). Thus, the deter-
mination of military essentiality mixes the "mission effect"
(a military decision) and the "maintenance potential" (a technic-
al decision). The next step is the creation of a mathematical
model, assigning weights to military essentiality, probability
H || -in ii n i II I II I ii i n ii i m m i.i i m i .. i
\
Robert G. Iverson et al., The growth of a Rational »
System Approach to Naval Repair Parts Inventories; The
Introduction of Military Essentiality (Research Report prepared
for th& Navy Graduate Financial Management Program, The George
Washington University, January, 1962), p. 53.
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of failure, site, and cost for each item. By varying the
weights, different "optimized" allowance lists can be prepared.
The Optimum COSAL concept has been used with considerable
success in development tests conducted in conjunction with the
Polaris submarine program. For the USS G£ORG£ WASKINGTON , six
allowance lists were prepared, employing various weights of the
several elements. These lists were then compared with the
actual experience of GEORGE WASHINGTON during deployment. Pre-
liminary comparisons indicate that the model with the best fit
would have provided fewer essential parts shortages, would have
required 17% less space, and would have cost 10% less, while
providing an equal range of repair parts and a greater depth.
*
Thus, the concept appears to offer considerable promise for
improving the military worth of allowance lists, while reducing
their costs. However, the project is still in the research
stage, and clearly offers numerous complications before it can
be applied to all ships. Some of the problems: Defining the
mission parameters of our multi-purpose ships} determining the
best mix of weights in the mathematical model, and testing the
model against actual results \ and establishing a central agency
within the Navy's complex bi-linear organization which can
exercise central direction over the preparation of allowance
lists which involve military-technical judgments, and a tre-
mendous amount of data from all parts of the naval establishment.
While moving forward towards the Optimum COSAL, the Navy
1Ibid. t p. 63.
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should not lose si|*ht of the fact that the presently existing
allowance lists are founded, also, on military-technical
judgment* While the decision making system is clearly less
satisfactory than the Optimum COSAL system, it nevertheless
represents a judgment made by the responsible officials. It
would seen logical, therefore, that the Navy take steps to
back up it© judgment by fudning the existing allowance defi-
ciencies through major r©programming , if necessary. It is clear
that, unless the Navy is ready to do this, it will be impossible
to argue for full funding at the DOD review level when the Navy,
by implication, is agreeing with the DOD contention that the
full funding of allowance deficiencies is not vital to fleet
readiness*
Consumer Funding
After a determination of what repair parts are necessary
aboard ship, it is still necessary to determine the type of
funding system which will provide the parts. One extreme is to
provide all necessary operating costs "free" to the user, funding
them at higher organizational levels* The other extreme would
be to provide the ship commander with a sum of money and require
him to "pay for" all of his operating costs with his own funds.
It appears logical that neither extreme represents an "ideal*
solution* The answer, therefore, lies somewhere in between*
The General Accounting Office, in a study conducted in
1962, found numerous instances where:
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• • • the preparedness of navy combat and service
ships • . i was being seriously affected by their
inability to obtain repair parts and other material
required for combat readiness • • « the immediate cause
for this was the insufficiency of consumer funds at the
level of the ships to purchase this material from the
stock funds,!
The GAO report contains an interesting discussion of the
argument against consumer funding:
. . • The combat and combat-support needs of the
individual units are subject to so many variables as
to preclude budgeting with any degree of accuracy each
units 1 fund requirements in advance. Furthermore,
requirements and priorities »ay change constantly after
the funds have been allotted. In addition, the total
amount of OEM funds is subject to competing demands
from a wide range of combat, housekeeping, and other
tasks that could be performed with these funds and to
individual judgments of military installation and ship
commanders as to the priorities to be given to these
tasks. As these funds are allotted to the great variety
of military activities and to and through the various
command strata, they become administratively earmarked
or drawn off for less essential purposes,*
Among the ^uneconomic" practices observed at local levels were:
1, Failure to cancel orders for excess items,
2, Ordering material not currently needed,
3, Duplicate supply activities,
H. Shipping items to avoid the cost of repair,
5, Returning needed items to get credit for more
urgently needed items,
6, Unnecessarily removing parts from equipment
and turning them in for credit,
3
The General Accounting Office recommendations were to:
U, S«, General Accounting Office, Report on Review of
Stock Funds and Related Consumer Funds in the Department of
Defense (The Comptroller General of the U, S., agtCNSg
June, 1962), II, p. 8,
2 lbid ,. p. 12,
3Ibld . t p. 13.
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1. Discontinue use of consumer funds for
repair parts anct combat material at the combat
and combat-support levels, funding would be provided!
a« At the departmental level, or
b. By eliminating consumer funds and proeuri:
material from annual appropriations.
2. Institute and strengthen supply management
techniques, instead of relying on fund control at
the combat level .1
The GAO recommendations are based on the assumptions
that? (1) a combat unit manager cannot predict his needs far
enough in advance to budget for them; and (2) a combat unit
manager cannot be depended upon to allocate his scarce resources
for the most essential purposes. With respect to navy ships,
the first assumption appears to be only partially true. While
it is true that individual component failures cannot be predicted,
it does not appear true that the commander cannot predict his
needs for ordinary consumable supplies and operating costs. It
would further appear that, when several similar ships are
aggregated, then the costs of component failures should bepin
to fall into a pattern. (Of course these are "normal" failures,
not due to battle damage, collision, or other abnormal conditions)
Thus, while the local commander may not be able to predict all of
his needs, he can predict some of them, and intermediate levels
of command can predict still others.
With respect to the second assumption, the Concept of
decentralised authority is involved. While it is true that there
are some decisions which local commanders cannot be allowed to





he is in a far better position to make than any other level.
Mis-allocation of resources is likely to occur only when upper
levels of management establish equal priorities for many
objectives, but fail to provide adequate resources to carry
them out. Thus, if a navy captain is required both to keep his
ship painted and his storerooms full, but is not given enough
money to do both, he is likely to paint the ship if a material
inspection is anticipated, or fill the storerooms if a supply
inspection is anticipated. Thus, fund control must go hand
in hand with other management controls in order to achieve
specific objectives. It would appear that the GAG proposal,
if carried to an extreme, would deprive the local commander of
some necessary flexibility in managing his affairs.
At the other extreme, the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet, has proposed chat onboard stocks of repair parts and
consumables be made a part of the Navy Stock Account *^ Under
this proposal, there would be no "free issue" of repair parts.
Instead, the onboard stocks would be funded from the Navy
Stock Account (a revolving fund) and would be paid for from
appropriated funds only when actually issued for use. The
The author is forced to admit, somewhat reluctantly,
that the Navy scheme of things seems, more often than not,
to put the emphasis on painting the ship to the exclusion
of filling the storeroom.
2
Letter from Commander in Chief, U, S, Pacific Fleet
to Chief of Naval Operations, serial 74/1087, dated March




purpose of tn« proposal was to overcorae allowance deficiencies
created by S8E fund shortages, on the assumption that the on
board stocks, at least, would be freed from dependence on annual
appropriations and would be maintained in full. Although the
Chief of ftaval Operations agreed that allowance shortages were
* matter of serious concarn, he indicated that the resources of
the Havy Stock Fund were insufficient to support this considerable
extension. Instead, he proposed a gradual shift of certain
slow moving-high cost items from the stock fund to direct
appropriation funding, which material would be provided on a
"free issue basis • * Although the ClfO appeared to reject the
concept of further downward extension of the stock fund, the
subject was again revived as a result of a DOD study. This
study recommended extension of the stock fund to tenders and
supply ships, but also recommended the exclusion of slow-moving
(so called insurance items) material not subject to turnover
management , ^ However, this study did not suggest extension of
stock fund to combatant ships, nor did its proposals substantial-
ly conflict with those of the CHO with respect to removing the
slow moving iteias from the fund.
In August 1982, the Secretary of the Navy issued an
instruction directing the transfer of certain iteras from the
•4 bid ,
2
Report of the "Operating Fund/Stock Fund Study"
to the Assistant Secretary of Defense ( Comptroller) , dated




Navy Stock Fund,* In general, items to bo excluded were those
of a high-cost low-demand nature, items with a high rate of
obsolescence , repairable-exchange items, non-priced items , items
involving personnel safety, and items with "high cost which are
locally unpredictable in demand and the acquisition of which at
the consumer level would place an inordinately heavy burden on
operation allotments." 2 Items which are to be excluded from the
stock fund will be funded by annual appropriations, contained
in the Other Procurement , Navy appropriation. Itesri management
will be vested in the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts which will
issue the material on a "free" basis in accordance with estab-
lished allowances. Allowance lists will be revised, in accordance
with the criteria, to determine which items will be Appropriation
Purchase (APA) funded. These items will be established in allow-
ances with mandatory limits for both range and depth, with
further provisions for a program of surveillance of inventories
to ensure supply discipline. The instruction directs BuSanda
to program funds for APA purchases commencing in FY 1365. Need-
less to say, this program will have a significant impact on S&£
funding requirements in the future, although no specific
decisions have as yet been made.
Although shifting of material from a stock fund-consumer
fund basis to a free issue basis will significantly influence
m i i iimi.iM n i ' " " i «
U. S., Department of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy,
Criteria for Exclusion of Items from the Navy and Marine Corps




the requirements for S6E funds, the long-run effect on the
fleet is by no means clear. In the first instance, it will
still be necessary to convince the budget analysts that the
material is needed aboard ship (the basic problem of allowance
lists). Secondly, there is every reason to assume that, for
every dollar programmed under the procurement account, a dollar
will be extracted from the S&E account, unless additional justi-
fication is forthcoming for the SfcE funds. Finally, assuming
that resources remain scarce (a safe assumption), the net effect
of the transfer is to shift the responsibility for allocating
the resources from the commanding officer of the ship (who is
directly involved) to a much higher echelon (not directly
involved in operations) with somewhat diffused responsibilities.
There is no doubt that this transfer of material will improve
the management of the stock funds. The basic concept of the
stock fund, a revolving fund, is to establish a buyer-seller
relationship between the supply activity and the consumer. This
relationship demands a fairly regular turnover of material, in
order to keep the capital of the stock fund working. The present
system has resulted in a great investment of stock account funds
in "dead 11 items with little or no demand, and has consequently
created a critical management problem. However, the basic
problem of managing material will remain regardless of the method
of financing. Thus the shift of material out of the stock fund,
while sound from the point of view of the stock fund manager,
offers no panacea for the overall material management problem.
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The basic problems discussed in the other sections of this
chapter remain to be solved
.
Before leaving the area of consumer funding, one
further observation is in order. There has been, and Is today,
a serious communication problem between the supply system
managers and the ultimate consumers, the ships. Although it
is obvious that shifting material from the stock account
(consumer funded) to appropriation purchase {free issue) has
profound effect on the fleet SSE funds, there has been no
effective communication taking place between the fleet and the
supply managers giving advance warning of shifts. For example,
a decision made by supply managers to shift liferafts from APA
to stock fund resulted in a considerable impact on fleet S6E
funds, since liferafts cost $1500 each. It would appear essen-
tial that this communications problem be solved, especially in
view of the massive shifts of material that are in prospect.
To accomplish this, the close participation of the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations (or the new Fleet Activities
Command) is vital in linking the fleets and the bureaus and
smoothing the flow of information.
Automating Logistics
Every study of management problems sooner or later
must come to grips with the problem of information flow. This
problem is especially acute in the entire logistics area in the
operating forces. (Logistics is here used in its broadest
sense). Although the last several decades has seen the
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introduction of modern automatic data processing equipment in
the navy supply system ashore, and, to a lesser extent, data
processing equipment in the fields of financial accounting and
personnel distribution, the management information system of the
operating forces continues to rely on hand posted ledgers,
typewritten records, and periodic reports received through the
mail* In addition, it is the operating forces which face the
most stringent restrictions on personnel and storage space, due
to the physical limitations of ships. There can be no doubt
that these limitations lead to the long-standing tradition in
the navy that ships shouldn*t worry about money, and that their
needs would be taken care of by the shore based supporting
establishment* Increasingly, however, it has become apparent
that the existing limitations of the information systems deprive
the fleet of the tools they need to determine their requirements,
and to coordinate the support being provided by the shore estab-
lishment. Thus, it is not surprising that several studies are
now being made to provide some measure of automation to the
flow of data afloat. As cited by the Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Fleet, "the motive for this effort is first, to improve ship
mission capabilities for increased endurance periods, and,
second, to cope with the increasing complexity of technical
naval equipment while at the same time holding forth against
the manpower and training squeeze,
I I I l t II 'I I I ' « I lll l II III III II II III I II I II ———
.
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^•Letter from Commander in Chief U, S, Atlantic Fleet




CincLantFlt called for a data processing system which
would treat the ship as an economic unit, and would provide for
the needs of the commanding officer, and, through aggregating,
higher command levels in the following areas:
1* Inventory accounting and inventory control,
including accumulation of usage and failure data;
2. Maintenance scheduling and maintenance management;
3. Determination of logistic readiness for mission;
*. Automated preparation of administrative, personnel,
supply, and disbursing records and reports.
*
While it was recognized that such a system was a highly complex
undertaking, the letter called for a feasibility study and
further research at the earliest possible date.
The maintenance management system, discussed earlier
in this chapter, includes a provision for a Uniform Maintenance
Data Collection System. This system is presently being designed
for installation in the fleet. Although this system is not
beinr considered as a component of the broader, integrated
logistics data system, it clearly fulfills point number two and
promises great improvement for fleet management. It is not yet
too late to take 3teps to integrate its design with a broader
framework.
The most ambitious undertaking is the programming,
for logistics applications, of the Navy Tactical Data System
(NTDS). This system, primarily designed for tactical applica-
tions, envisions the installation cf general purpose computers
abroad certain combat ships. Currently, three logistics programs





are being developed] General end Technical Store* , Commissary
Stores, and Aviation Stores .^ These programs provide for the
maintenance of inventories, preparation of reports on re-order,
usage, and other required applications* The computer is also
capable of preparing this information in machine language for
rapid transmission to the logistic system ashore, although
this possibility is not yet being actively developed*
Although the NTDS-Logistie application represents almost
the "ultimate* approach in shipboard data processing, its
application to the fleet as a whole is doubtful , due to the
very high cost. What is needed, and what is presently not
being done, is a more modest study to determine the actual
logistics data requirements at all levels, and how these data
can be generated with the fewest inputs and operations at all
levels* It is unlikely that many ships will, in the forseeable
future, be maintaining their stock records in computers*
However, it does seem reasonable that much more useful informa-
tion can be "wrung* from the vast volume of reports flowing
daily between the fleet and the shore establishment* In addi-
tion, less sophisticated (but less expensive) data processing
equipment can be placed aboard many ships to handle specific
applications, such as the recent installation of punched card
equipment in tenders and supply ships to maintain stock records*
ill ill —»—.— II I I I i I i ip. I i »i i ii iii i . .1 i . ,
1
Milton H* Selekiaan, "Logistics Data Automation
Afloat," Monthly Newsletter of the U. S. ^avy Supply Corps
.
April 1963, p* 14.
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The crucial first step is not the design on one grand computer
program which will supply everyone with all needed information.
Rather* the first step is to recognise that all levels of
management needs information, that this information begins with
some one making an initial report, and proceeding from this
point to reduce to a minimum the number of repetitious proceed-
ings of the same basic bit of information. The sheer size and
complexity of the navy make it extremely unlikely that any one
system can or will ever be designed to do the whole job.
Conclusions: The Destroyer as an Entity. Revisited
At this point, it is well to go back to our basic
problem. At every level of management, the job of the manager
is to allocate his resources so as most efficiently to achieve
his objectives. Since the sheer size of the defense establish-
ment makes seeing the "big picture" almost impossible, one
must also recognise that resource allocations are, inevitably,
sub-optimizations.* In addition, the nature of the defense
mission dictates that the CO will tend to make two kinds of
resource allocations: the dollar and the non-dollar. The
decision to fire the guns at an attacking enemy will not be




*By recognizing that we are sub-optimizing, one also
recognizes the inevitability of conflict. Thus, the "right"
choice by the ship's CO, may be the "wrong" choice from the
type commanders point of view. Unless one chooses to deny the
CO the right to make any decisions, he must accept the fact
that conflicts will happen, and learn to minimize them. The
rational approach is, clearly, to deny to the lower levels
those decisions which will result in too much conflict (e.g.,
the decision to use nuclear weapons). Note, however, this does
not mean that the unit CO should be left with no decisions.
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based on considerations of cost of the ammunition, but
rather, on the probability of hitting. Similarly, the decision
to repair the radar will not be based on the cost of the parts,
but on the availability of the parts, and the technical skills
of the technician. However, a decision as to whether to have
the foul weather clothing cleaned, or to buy new, will be based
on the relative cost and effectiveness of the two alternatives.
It is crucial to recognize that, at the combat ship level, the
Commanding Officer does not usually use dollars as the common
denominator of resource availability. He lives in both a
dollar and a non-dollar economy. Any discussion of fund manage-
ment at the shipboard level must be conditioned on this fact.
It was concluded, in Chapter II, that the objectives of
the destroyer commander are twos to maintain his ship; and to
operate his ship to produce the maximum possible combat readi-
ness. To accomplish his objectives, the ship commander has
control over only a small fraction of the dollar-resources which
pay for the true costs involved. 1 Nevertheless, these dollar-
resources represent an extremely critical portion of his total
resources. In studying the development of the budget in Chapter
III, it appeared that ship operating funds are not keeping pace
with the ever-increasing cost of newer ships. The reason for
this lag appears to be duo to an inability to satisfy DOD
budget analysts that the funds are needed. Their aoubxs revolve
around two main points: how valid are the allowance lists; and
«———«—mmmmt—H—Ml I i i ————a*— I I I I i I i i i »»»i»«»«««»i«M»«»»«r«l<i««ii»««»MMMi«»
*About 6% of the total costs. Supra . . p« 30.
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how much of the funds are going to non-essential purposes. The
answer to this problem "in the small" is to extend the detail
in which shipboard accounting records are kept, and to report
this data up the line. However, in our concluding discussion,
it appears that the problem "in the lar&e" essentially revolves
around the question of delegation of authority. From this point
of view, the question iss should we provide the unit commander
with all necessary material for "free", making the decisions as
to what he needs at the departmental level, or should we give
the local commander complete control of his resources and complete
freedom to spend them as he thinks best. As with most questions,
the answer to this one lies somewhere between the two extremes.
From our earlier discussion of the dollar, and the non-
dollar economies, it must be concluded that some resources must
always be provided the local commander "free", that i3, in non-
dollar terms. For example, it is clearly impossible to leave it
up to each ship commander to provide himself* with a crew. The
practical problems of recruitment and training, as well as those
of national manpower policies, make it obvious that central
direction must be exercised over personnel. It might be argued
that the CO could, subject to policy control, be permitted to
hire, fire, and pay his personnel as a measure of decentralized
control. But if, as seems likely, the "policy control" extended
to the specific control of how many men, in what ranks and skills,
and under uniform pay policies, what flexibility remains to the
commander? He becomes merely a paying agent with no true control.
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So it is with many other types of resources , control of which
must be exercised at higher levels in order to prevent gross
sub-optimizing.
However , as Hitch has pointed cut, some decentralization
of decision making is essential, else the organization beer
"muscle-bound". So, the question that mlui is, what dollar-
resources can best be allocated by the ship's co&uaandinn officer,
and what resources should be allocated at successively higher
levels of command? It is obvious that no one "right" answer can
be given to this question, nor can the answer be expected to
stand still. Nevertheless, it would seem that a logical basis
for answering the question is to ask as a corollary question:
Are we willing to permit the CO to exercise reasonably wide
latitude in allocating his dollars? If the answer is no; if we
intend to control in detail the precise allocation, then we have
again made him a mere paying agent, a task that can be more
efficiently performed elsewhere. This is not to say, of course,
that no controls can be accepted. It is precisely in this field
that modern data processing can be of greatest advantage. If
higher levels of management are able to receive frequent, accur-
ate, and timely reports on the performance of subordinate
managers, they will be less hesitant to delegate authority to
them. Note that the key word is, a report on performance . It
is precisely at this point that our present management systems




are weakest. At present, we have almost no basis upon which to
judge the performance of the CO in using his dollar-resources.
All we know is that the money has been spent. Thus, it is clear
that our real problem is to achieve a reporting system that will
tell higher levels of management what has been spent, for what
purpose . and with what result .
The report of what has been spent is the least of our
present worries. Nevertheless, it seems essential that the time
lag in reporting allotment status be reduced even further, and,
wore importantly, that the vexing problem of credits be solved,
the solution of this question seems to lie in the direction of
recognizing credits separately rather than as a deduction from
funds obligated.
Reporting the purpose for which funds have been spent
calls for the establishment of a uniform set of cost accounts









Cost, as used here, means the value of the material when it is
issued from the store room to the user. Although it would be
helpful to have data processing equipment aboard ship to assist
m ifmt.Mmmm—mmmmm « —h—— m' nmmm i» twin n nm * im»«w— iih m imIih i h» «wi wii.iww i i» »m « w— n^i i mm*m.—n » .« —,— , m. m i.»» »«—«
Interview with CDR C. J. Stringer, SC, USN, Fleet
Supply Management Officer, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, March 1963.
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with this task, it would not be essential, CruDesLant is
presently able to obtain this information, in spite of the fact
that destroyers, typically, have a very small supply department
and a relatively inexperienced one, To be useful to higher
levels, it is clearly necessary that the cost accounts be uniform
among all ships. The question of inventory evaluation aust also
be considered. In this regard, the author does not consider it
necessary to install a perpetual inventory system, in dollar
terms, for all material afloat. The maintenance of such a comp-
lete dollar inventory would be a task of considerable magnitude,
and doubtful accuracy with the present personnel and time
available. However, it is feasible to maintain accurately a
priced inventory of frequently used items (Selected Items),
and such an inventory is also an absolutely necessary tool of
supply management. A^i other items remain essentially static
over the two year period between overhauls. Thus, a complete
inventory could be taken and priced during each supply overhaul,
which would serve as a base figure. This base could be adjusted
by periodic reports of the selected item inventory, thus provid-
ing an inventory value sufficiently accurate for any management
purpose. Furthermore, these inventories would be validated when
the next supply overhaul is conducted. The inventory base
figure, as updated by periodic reports on the selected items,
could be maintained by the type commander and higher levels of
In CruDesLant, these are defined as items with three
or more demands between overhauls, and make up only about »%
of all stocked items.
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management, if desired, and it could be broken down by type of
material, or by any other detail desired. Such an inventory
system obviously lends itself well to automatic data processing
methods, However, in order to apply ADP, the needs of the shore
supply establishment and the fleets must be closely integrated,
a step which has yet to be taken. In addition, such a system
would place the burden of resolving the problems of non-priced
items, and the inclusion of equipage, where it belongs, namely
at the supply system level, not on the individual ship* Finally,
it must be recognised that the inventory "value* problem is only
a part of the broader question of material management, and any
solution to it should serve both the small and the large purpose.
Thus, the purpose of inventory controls is not primarily to
justify budget requests, but to facilitate the efficient main-
tenance and operation of our ships. The achievement of this
larger purpose can only be achieved by recognizing that this is
not a small problem to be solved at the shipboard level, but a
large problem requiring coordinated action by all elements of
the naval establishment.
Evaluating results of dollar-resource management remains
the toughest nut to crack. Since our objective is to maintain,
and to produce combat readiness, it is these two factors which
must be measured. However, to measure these areas is an extremely
difficult problem, fraught with subjective values. Nevertheless,
measurement systems do exist, and better ones are, hopefully,
being developed. What K>ust be done, therefore, is to correlate
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the measured costs against these results to see if any meaningful
answers can be obtained. At this level of development, it seems
probable that the best that can be obtained is a general indica-
tion of the efficiency with which the resources have been
employed. What is needed is to create a climate wherein the
seniors in higher levels of ccmwand begin to reflect on cost
versus results considerations. The tendency today is primarily
on results alone , without sufficient regard for the costs, either
dollar or non-dollar. The solution appears to be education.
By establishing a system of performance reports, we have
merely established a framework within which authority can be
decentralised. It still remains to be determined precisely which
dollar-resources should be decentralised to the shipboard level.
The author has concluded that the present structure of decision
allocation is reasonably satisfactory, in view of the many
higher-level considerations involved in the vast majority of
resource allocation decisions which can only be optimised at
higher levels. The principal argument concerns itself with
funding stocks of repair parts. To the extent that the allowance
list quantities are mandatory, then it would seem logical to
provide these parts Mfree n . To do otherwise is to impose an
impossible situation on the commanding officer, since he may not
choose to buy the part, yet he may have insufficient funds to
both buy it and perform other, equally important tasks. On the
other hand, the CO is in many cases in the best position to
determine what he does and doesn't need in his storerooms. It
would therefore seem that, as allowance lists are prepared under
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the optimum COSAL process, a provision be made to budget for
those items which have a fixed t mandatory quantity at the
departmental level. This places the responsibility for resource
allocation at the same level as the technical decision as to
carrying the part in the inventory or not. Thus, if funds are
net available to buy all "necessary" parts, the allowance list
preparation activity is the best position to determine which
parts are less "necessary". On the other hand, those items which
will call for variable quantity, to be determined by actual ships
usage, should be funded for at the shipboard level. Here, the
ship's CO is in the best position to allocate his scarce resources
The present research program in the Optimum COSAL, and the current
SecNav directive to move high-cost, low-demand items out of the
stock fund and into a frea-is3ue basis seem to be steps in the
right direction.
No matter at what level the allocation determinations
are made, there must be adequate feedback of information between
the user and the allocator. This is the most serious weakness
of our present system. It seems likely that, even under the
most rational system of allowance list preparation, there will
be a continuous shifting of material from "free" to stock fund,
and back again. It is essential that the navy organize itself
in such a way so as to facilitate the fi*ee flow of both technical
(usage) data, and financial data as changes occur. If we install
a simple, uniform system of cost accounts we can begin to develop
meaningful cost information that will provide a valid basis for
the ship commander to plan and budget for. Similarly, the

aggregates of this cost information can be used at higher
levels to develop standard costs for similar classes of ships*
However, none of these procedures will prove worthwhile if the
system of communications is unable to inform the various manage-
raent levels of impending changes in the "ground rules" which may
have a profound effect on future costs. It is at this point
that the "producer" and the "consumer" are absolutely inter-
related*
As Chris Argyris has observed, "Budgets are accounting
techniques designed to control costs through people ."^ It is
only through improved organization and human understanding and
cooperation that any real improvement will be made in Navy
financial management*
*Chris Argyris, "Human Problems with Budgets,"
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